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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays that focus on tournaments, incentives, and
performance. The first essay presents evidence of cheating that took place in on-
line examinations during COVID-19 lockdowns and proposes two solutions with and
without a camera for the cheating problem based on the experience accumulated by
online chess communities over the past two decades. The best implementable solution
is a uniform online exam policy where a camera capturing each students computer
screen and room is a requirement.
The second essay investigates the “superstar effect” using observations from chess
tournaments. Superstars exist in many places. In competition, they might intimidate
others, forcing their peers to exert less effort. On the other hand, superstars might
encourage others because their participation in a competition encourages everybody
to “step up” their game. We analyze direct and indirect effects of a superstar on
their peers by analyzing six different chess superstars between 1962-2019. The results
suggest that the direct superstar effect is always negative, but the indirect superstar
effect depends on the intensity of the superstar. If the skill gap between the superstar
and the rest is small, there is a positive peer effect. However, when the skill gap is
large, the indirect effect is negative.
The third essay examines the impact of expectations on performance. Tradition-
ally, the red corner has been designated for the favorite fighter in fighting sports. The
fighter in the red corner could gain a mental edge over their opponent, with their an-
nouncement as the favorite before the fight. This essay asks "Can corner assignment
itself change the odds of wins and losses?" Using more than 5,000 fights that took
iv
place as part of Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) between 1993 and 2020, we
identify fighters who were assigned to the red corner, but should have been assigned
to the blue corner per their performance record. The results show that underdog
fighters who get assigned to the red corner perform significantly better even against
stronger opposition, suggesting performance gains with salient expectations.
v
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Chapter 1
Online Cheating Amid COVID-191
1.1 Introduction
"No matter what the game is,
when there are benefits from
winning, you have cheating."
−Arkady Dvorkovich, FIDE
President, 2020.∗
The COVID-19 pandemic changed the lives of all people globally with most activities
being forced to move online, including teaching. Most schools and universities moved
from face-to-face to online delivery in March 2020. Among other difficulties related to
online teaching, measuring student performance became one of the chief concerns of
instructors. Many universities reported widespread cheating in online examinations
that took place in Spring 2020, and the problem became so rampant that even the
media addressed it. See, for example, two recent articles in Washington Post (Newton
2020) and Inside Higher Ed (Lederman 2020).2 The 2020 Advanced Placement (AP)
examinations illustrate the difficulty of measuring true student performance on online
examinations without proctoring. Figure 1.1 shows surges of Google searches on key-
words related to exam topics perfectly correlating with the time of the examinations.
1Eren Bilen with Alexander Matros. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion, 182, February 2021, pp. 196-211. Reprinted here with permission of publisher.
1∗The International Chess Federation (FIDE) is the governing body of chess, and
it regulates all international chess competitions.
2See the Washington Post article and the article on InsideHigherEd.
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Since the online environments used for the 2020 AP exams had no proctoring, many
students took advantage of having immediate access to Google search.3
Currently, most schools and universities are occupied with the switch to online
teaching. Consequently, will the cheating problem in the fall be significant enough
for schools and universities to take strict measures for the future? Will it be possible
to have a fair assessment system if schools and universities decide to take no action?
How can schools and universities maintain academic integrity in online examinations?
We must wait several months to get clear answers. However, we can make predictions
on the possible outcomes by considering theory and past evidence on cheating.
The problem of cheating in online environments is not new. Online chess, in
particular, has been plagued by cheating ever since chess was first introduced to the
internet, with players gaining an unfair advantage by using computer assistance.4
Online chess started when the Internet Chess Club (ICC) was established in 1995.
The ICC first ran annual Dos Hermanas online blitz tournaments with monetary
prizes in the early 2000s. Games were not proctored, and a whole array of cheating
scandals consequently arose, with many ways to cheat in those events. In order to
function, the ICC had to disqualify numerous people, including a former Junior World
Champion, a top Chinese player, a top German player, hundreds of titled players,
and thousands of amateurs (who enjoyed beating titled players). The main way to
cheat was to use chess computer programs that found the best moves.
Now, Chess.com is the most popular online chess club with many tournaments
including monetary prizes. Unsurprisingly, cheating has surfaced as a huge prob-
lem, prompting Chess.com to create its own cheating detection unit. See Chess.com
3College Board did not consider internet search to be cheating for the 2020 AP
examinations. However, even if internet search was considered cheating, ensuring
that students not use internet search during the test would be a challenging task.
4Cheating in chess is a big issue in both online and over-the-board set-
tings. This problem is relevant even in scholastic chess events. See
https://en.chessbase.com/post/promoting-fair-play-among-child-chess-players
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Fair Play And Cheat-Detection.5 The website states: “Though legal and practical
considerations prevent Chess.com from revealing the full set of data, metrics, and
tracking used to evaluate games in our fair-play tool, we can say that at the core of
Chess.com’s system is a statistical model that evaluates the probability of a human
player matching an engine’s top choices, and surpassing the confirmed clean play of
some of the greatest chess players in history.”
Cheating before the pandemic on both the ICC and Chess.com is similar to the
online cheating problem that arose in Spring 2020. Thriving throughout COVID-19,
cheating skyrocketed for online chess as well. For example, Chess.com announced on
August 19, 2020 that it closes more than 500 accounts every day for cheating and
has closed over 400, 000 accounts in total, projecting to close 1, 000, 000 accounts by
mid-2023. Of those closed accounts, nearly 400 were titled players. The only seeming
positive statistic that was found indicated that female players cheat much less, only
accounting for 4.57% of all title players.6 However, recent weeks revealed an explosion
of top women players cheating in both online and over the board tournaments as
well. Former Women’s World Champion, Anna Ushenina, was accused of cheating
after her Internet 2020 Grand Prix victory. Another example is Patrycja Waszczuk, a
titled young chess player, medalist of the Polish Championships, and medalist of the
European Chess Championships, who was banned online and also caught cheating
during her game at the Chess Festival in Ustron.7
If we can learn anything from online chess, then the message is very clear: online
cheating will only get much worse and schools and universities will have their first





and can ban any player for any reason, schools and universities will have a much more
difficult task to provide clear evidence that proves students’ cheating.
Both the ICC and Chess.com have been successful to some degree in dealing with
the cheating problem although it is nowhere near to being solved. Interestingly, there
are similarities in addressing the problem by both chess websites. First, they do not
reveal their detection systems. Second, their disqualification decision is final. This
approach admits that the detection system is vulnerable to knowledgeable cheaters.
Since the websites do not have the resources to check millions of games, they im-
plement a simple way to address the problem: a chess website monitors particular
characteristics of play, and its methods of analyzing these characteristics are not re-
vealed to the players. Players do not know what the website is looking for, making
cheating more difficult.8
This cheating behavior supports the mounting evidence that the lack of “perfect
honesty” exists in situations where the returns to dishonesty are high. Numerous stud-
ies using different settings and samples investigated in Gneezy (2005), Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), Gächter and Schulz (2016), and Vanberg (2017) show that
people are more likely to deceive if the marginal benefit from deception is significantly
large. Therefore, professional competitions and examinations have to use extensive
monitoring to prevent cheating. However, lockdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic
in early 2020 made monitoring very difficult (or impossible) in many situations. On-
line tests are done without face-to-face proctoring, which implies that students can
potentially use their notes, internet search, and any other assistance to help them
solve questions. Furthermore, they can communicate via teleconference (or some
other method) and collaborate during their exams. This cheating behavior on online
8For example, there are numerous cases of titled players admitting they had
cheated and were correctly identified and caught by Chess.com.
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examinations imposes a negative externality on students who do not cheat, especially
if the instructor curves the exam scores.
In this paper, we first consider two simple models of face-to-face and online ex-
aminations. These models suggest that unlike the face-to-face examination, cheating
should be expected in the online examination, with the reason being very intuitive:
the instructor can observe cheating evidence in the face-to-face examination, but there
is only indirect cheating evidence in the online examination. Therefore, cheating is a
part of the student equilibrium strategy in the online examination.
We then present evidence of cheating that took place in an online examination
held as part of a course taught at a large public university in Spring 2020 during
COVID-19 lockdowns. Using a simple way to detect cheating - timestamps from
the students’ Access Logs - we identify cases where students were able to type in
their answers under thirty seconds per question. We found that the solution keys for
the exam were distributed online, and these students typed in the correct as well as
incorrect answers using the solution keys they had at hand.
Now we suggest how to mitigate cheating based on the experience accumulated
by online chess communities in the last two decades. Currently, many universities are
requiring students to purchase and use a camera to record themselves while taking
an exam in order to crack down on cheating, but these rules conflict with privacy
rights from some students’ perspectives. In order to address this issue based on
our theoretical models, we suggest that instructors present their students with two
options: (1) If a student voluntarily agrees to use a camera to record themselves
while taking an exam, this record can be used as evidence of innocence if the student
is accused of cheating; (2) If the student refuses to use a camera due to privacy
concerns, the instructor should be allowed to make the final decision on whether or
not the student is guilty of cheating, with evidence of cheating remaining private to
the instructor. Both options are designed to "implement" the outcome of the face-to-
5
Note: 2020 AP Exams were held online due to COVID-19 related school closures.
Hourly online search data is obtained from Google Trends. The search data covers
the U.S. nationwide.
Figure 1.1 Google search trends around the time of the 2020 AP Exams
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face examination when cheating is not expected in the equilibrium. Of course, there
are other ways to achieve the same outcome. For example, students can take exams
at proctoring centers.
The implications of this paper are simple: if no action is taken for online exams
in the upcoming semester, there will be widespread cheating. Students have much to
gain while the probability of being caught with definitive evidence is close to zero.
Using online proctoring services involving the use of a camera is one solution - albeit
imperfect - to the problem of cheating. We believe that cheating can never be fully
detected online and therefore recommend that instructors stay away from curving
their grades in order to not punish honest students.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents mixed evidence
about online and face-to-face cheating, Section 3 provides two theoretical models for
face-to-face and online exams, Section 4 presents examples of online cheating, and
Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Educational institutions have traditionally been using proctoring in order to ensure
academic integrity on examinations. Online education, however, typically relies on
unproctored examinations that are held online. Previous surveys exploring cheating
in online examinations generally claim that there is little to no difference between
face-to-face and online examinations in terms of cheating. Watson and Sottile (2010)
surveyed 635 students from a medium-sized university and asked whether or not
they had previously cheated on an examination. They found that 32.1% of students
from face-to-face courses admitted to cheating. For students from online courses,
the admitted cheating rate was 32.7%. Observing that these rates are very similar,
they claim that online courses do not involve more cheating. However, the main
concern regarding their methodology is that they rely on self-reporting which requires
7
students admitting they have cheated rather than actually using a mechanism to
detect cheating.
The next set of research addressing cheating concerns in online education includes
Fask, Englander, and Wang (2014) which used random assignment of students to
face-to-face and online examinations. They first assessed student performance using
practice tests and found that the online test-takers scored 14% lower than those who
took the practice test held proctored in class. However on the actual test, online test-
takers scored 10% higher than the face-to-face test-takers. While their methodology
had limitations in terms of detecting cheating, it provides suggestive evidence on
cheating for students who take unproctored online examinations.
More concrete evidence on cheating in online environments is presented in Dee and
Jacob (2012), Karim, Kaminsky, and Behrend (2014), and Diedenhofen and Musch
(2017). Using a text-based algorithm that detects plagiarism, Dee and Jacob (2012)
show that 112 out of 1,200 papers submitted on the Blackboard from a sample of
28 universities were plagiarized. They suggest that giving a quick tutorial explaining
how plagiarism jeopardizes academic integrity at the beginning of the semester is
an effective tool in preventing plagiarism. However, this may not be as effective for
more direct cases of cheating. Using evidence from laboratory and online experiments,
Diedenhofen and Musch (2017) show that participants cheat more (via Google search)
when monetary incentives are higher. They use a computer program that triggers
a pop-up message if a participant frequently changes browser tabs in a short period
of time with the message stating that the researchers are aware of the participant’s
cheating activity, which reduces cheating sharply. In another experimental setting
using participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, Karim, Kaminsky, and Behrend
(2014) show that low-cost technology, such as web-cameras, are effective at decreasing
cheating without necessarily impacting test performance. However, they observe
8
negative reactions from a portion of the participants pointing out that these web-
cameras may be viewed as invasive and thus raise feelings of pressure and tension.
There is vast literature exploring cheating and deception. Becker (1968) was
the first to provide the rationale for individuals who take part in illegal activities.
An empirical investigation on cheaters and their incentives in Duggan and Levitt
(2002) show that individuals are indeed more likely to cheat if they view returns to
cheating are high and that these returns come with little cost.9 Field experiments
using different settings reveal that individuals deceive more if the cost of deception
is small; see Gneezy (2005), Erat and Gneezy (2012), Gächter and Schulz (2016),
Vanberg (2017), Martinelli et al. (2018), Charness et al. (2019), Alan, Ertac, and
Gumren (2020), and Maggioni and Rossignoli (2020).
1.3 Theory
We will consider two cheating games in this section. The sequential-move game cor-
responds to in-class exams when a professor can observe a student’s action (cheating
or not) and make an informed decision based on that action. The simultaneous-move
game approximates online exams when the professor cannot observe a student and
has to decide whether or not the student cheated based on indirect evidence only.
Of course, these two games are an over-simplistic way to model in-class and online
exams. However, even this simple approach gives qualitative and intuitive predictions:
a student should not cheat in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the sequential
game, and student cheating is part of a unique equilibrium in the simultaneous-move
game.
9Along with Jacob and Levitt (2003) these papers were later included in Levitt
and Dubner (2005): the Freakonomics book, documentary, and podcast series.
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1.3.1 Sequential-move game
In the sequential-move game, the student chooses to either cheat or be honest. The
professor observes the student choice and decides either to report the student for
cheating or not.
There are four outcomes in this game, but the professor and the student rank
these outcomes differently. The professor’s outcomes from the best to the worst are
(honest, do not report), (cheat, report), (cheat, do not report), (honest, report),
where we record paths of play in brackets. The student’s outcomes from the best to
the worst are (cheat, do not report), (honest, do not report), (honest, report), (cheat,














Figure 1.2 Game Tree for the sequential move game
It is easy to find a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, where the student
is honest and the professor does not report the student. Note that this is the best
outcome for the professor and the second best outcome for the student.
This sequential-move game is supposed to be played between the student and
the professor during in-class exams. In the current situation, one way to implement
this game is to use a camera to record the student while taking an exam. However,
many students say that camera use conflicts with privacy rights and advocate taking
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exams without cameras. In other words, these students suggest to play the following
simultaneous-move game.
1.3.2 Simultaneous-move game
Let us consider a simple simultaneous-move game between a student and a profes-
sor. The student has two actions: cheat or be honest, and the professor also has
two actions: report the student for cheating or not.10 There are four outcomes in
this game, and the professor and the student rank these outcomes differently. The
professor’s outcomes from the best to the worst are (honest, do not report), (cheat,
report), (cheat, do not report), (honest, report). The student’s outcomes from the
best to the worst are (cheat, do not report), (honest, do not report), (honest, report),
(cheat, report). Table 1.1 gives an example of players’ payoffs. This game has a
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, which means that the student and the professor
should randomize between their two actions in equilibrium. Thus cheating as well as
reporting is a part of the equilibrium.
Table 1.1 Payoff Matrix for the simultaneous move game
Professor
Report Not
Student Cheat 1, 3 4, 2
Honest 2, 1 3, 4
In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the student randomizes between her two choices
in such a way to make the professor indifferent between his two choices. So, in order
to determine the equilibrium probability of the student’s cheating, we have to look
at the professor’s payoffs. To make our point clear, we restrict our attention on a
simplified payoff Table 1.2, where we only record the professor’s payoffs. Moreover,
we normalize the best payoff at one and the worst payoff at zero, and 0 ≤ c ≤ b ≤ 1.
10In fact, the game can be played sequentially without the professor knowing the
student’s action. The normal-form of this game and our results are the same.
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Table 1.2 Payoff Matrix for the professor
Professor
Report Not
Student Cheat ., b ., c
Honest ., 0 ., 1
It is easy to find now that the equilibrium probability of the student cheating, p, is
equal to
p = 11 + (b− c) . (1.1)
If the professor does not feel a big difference between (cheat, report) and (cheat,
do not report) outcomes, or the difference (b − c) is small and close to zero, then
the cheating probability is the highest, and in the extreme case, if (b − c) = 0, this
probability is equal to one, p = 1. However, if the professor is concerned and sees
a significant difference between (cheat, report) and (cheat, do not report) outcomes,
then the student cheating probability goes down.
1.3.3 The Problem and the Solution
Note that the student is honest in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the
sequential-move game, which approximates in-class exams. However, the student
is supposed to cheat in the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in the simultaneous-
move game, which is a proxy for the online exams. These findings demonstrate that
cheating should be higher in online tests, and these observations are intuitive, with
many instructors having first hand experience with them from face-to-face and online
teaching.11
11See our discussion in Section 2.
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The main problem revolving around online tests is how to prove cheating. Typ-
ically, students require to see evidence of their cheating and the professor only has
indirect evidence of cheating. Having only indirect evidence makes it much harder
to prove that cheating took place in case of an academic integrity referral. Thus, the
professor is reluctant to report cheating in online exams, or the difference b − c is
close to zero in expression (1) for the equilibrium cheating probability. This in turn
encourages even more cheating.12
How can this evidence problem be resolved? Many instructors have their own
statistical evidence of students cheating. Some of these statistics are simple but very
efficient. We present one such statistic – time spent per question – in the next section.
However, once such a statistic is revealed to students, the instructor would not be
able to use it again because students adjust accordingly. The solution is not to reveal
information based on which the student was found guilty of cheating. In other words,
if the professor claims that the student was cheating and this decision is final, then
we indeed get the simultaneous-move game from the previous section.
We suggest to offer two options to a student. If the student buys a camera and
uses it during the exam, then the sequential-move game is played, cheating is not
expected (in the equilibrium), and both the student and the professor have evidence
of the student’s behavior on the exam. Alternatively, the student can have an exam
without a camera in the privacy of their own home. In this case the simultaneous-
move game is played, some cheating is expected in the equilibrium, and if the professor
has evidence of cheating and claims cheating, then the student cannot request any
evidence and appeal the verdict.
12Anectodal evidence suggests that many instructors were indeed reluctant to re-
port cheating in Spring 2020. Despite this, the number of reported cheating cases
at a large public university (reported by their Academic Integrity Office) went up by
almost 10% in March−June 2020 relative to March−June 2019.
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1.4 Data: Evidence
Finding concrete evidence on cheating in an online examination is potentially chal-
lenging, as demonstrated in earlier studies (Watson and Sottile 2010; Fask, Englander,
and Wang 2014). In this section, we present cases in which students were able to cor-
rectly solve several questions under thirty seconds per question.13 The mechanism
we use to identify cheating is the "Access Log" provided on the Blackboard. The Ac-
cess Log provides detailed timestamps which show exactly how much time a student
spends on each question. Many students appear to be unaware that the time they
spend on each question is recorded although they seem to expect that the information
on the "total time" they take for the exam is recorded.14
Our data comes from students who were enrolled in an intermediate-level course
in Spring 2020 at a large public university. The course had three Midterms and
had an optional Final Exam which replaced the lowest Midterm exam. The first
two Midterms were held face-to-face with proctoring; the third Midterm and the
Final Exam were held online asynchronously on the Blackboard following COVID-19
related campus closures. On these online exams, students received the same set of
questions in a random order. The questions were all short answer questions: the
student had to type in the correct answer to receive credit with no multiple choice
options given. In order to move to the next question, the student had to save and
submit their answer; no moving back and forward was allowed.
13The questions on the exam are problem-solving questions which are arguably
not-so-trivial in terms of finding the solutions. The exam is not multiple-choice – the
student must type in the correct answer to receive credit.
14There were instances of students finishing their tests and waiting to submit them.
The test was designed such that students could not go back and recheck their answers.
Therefore, waiting could not improve or change their results. In one extreme case,
a student finished the test in 11 minutes and waited for more than 1 hour before
submitting it, so that the total time spent on the test would look "normal". We
believe this provides evidence on individuals involved in cheating attempting to "hide
their trails" similar to what was observed in Jacob and Levitt (2003).
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Table 1.3 presents scoresheets for two particular students who took the course
in Spring 2020. Figures 1.3–1.4 show how much time each student spent on each
question during Midterm 3 and the Final Exam with responses in Tables 1.4–1.5.
On Midterm 3, students have both correct and incorrect answers and had to spend
some time reading the problems and working to solve them. Their time allocation,
combined with their performance, shows no strange results for Midterm 3. However,
their Access Logs reveal very peculiar information for the Final Exam.
Table 1.3 Student 1 and 2’s scoresheets
Exam Score Letter
Midterm 1 35/100 F
Midterm 2 55/100 F
Midterm 3 30/100 F
Final 95/100 A
(a) Student 1’s scoresheet
Exam Score Letter
Midterm 1 50/100 F
Midterm 2 40/100 F
Midterm 3 50/100 F
Final 95/100 A
(b) Student 2’s scoresheet
Note: Student’s Midterm 3 score is 6/20; Final score is 19/20. Total time he spent
on Midterm 3 was 1 hour and 10 minutes. Total time he spent on the Final exam
was 11 minutes.
Figure 1.3 Time spent per question for Student 1
Figures 1.3–1.4 reveal cases where students had to spend less than thirty seconds to
solve a question. However, each of these questions requires complex problem-solving
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Note: Student’s Midterm 3 score is 10/20; Final score is 19/20. Total time he
spent on Midterm 3 was 1 hour 20 minutes. Total time he spent on the Final exam
(excluding Question #7) was 36 minutes.
Figure 1.4 Time spent per question for Student 2
skills, demonstrating that a student would need to spend a reasonable amount of time
to find each solution. Furthermore, the students had to type in their answers since
the exam was not a multiple choice exam. The questions typically had non-trivial
answers such as "6534" or "650" which would make it very challenging to randomly
guess the correct answers. In fact, the probability of randomly guessing the correct
answers on this exam is much less than the probability of winning the lottery.15
Furthermore, there is evidence that these two cases are connected. Students’ an-
swers for all twenty questions on the Final Exam perfectly match. Both students
made only one mistake on the same question where they both submitted the same
incorrect answer of "125". Figure 1.5 shows the answers submitted by the rest of the
class on this particular question, and it appears only three students submitted "125"
while the rest of the class submitted a whole range of different numbers. Two of these
15A rough estimate on the probability of "being lucky" on the Final Exam and
guessing the correct answers by randomly submitting numbers is less than 1× 10−20.
The probability of winning the lottery is around 1× 10−7. This rough estimate takes
into account a student’s potential to "guesstimate" the range for the correct answer.
16













































Note: Incorrect answers are highlighted in red. Student 1 received 6/20 on the
Midterm 3, and 19/20 on Final. Student 1 waited for 1 hour and 13 minutes before
submitting his test. Order of questions students receive in each exam are randomized
for each student. The student has to save his answers to continue to the next question.
three students are Students 1 and 2.16 Lastly, timestamps from their Access Logs
show that once Student 2 finished his exam, Student 1 started his immediately (in 2
minutes) after Student 2 finished submitting his answers. We believe the probabil-
ity that these students cheated and cooperated is higher than a random statistical
occurrence.
16This question was by far the most difficult question on the exam with a correct
response rate of only 19.3%. The third student who submitted "125" scored 18/20 on
the Final Exam. His other incorrect answer was "12", and the correct answer for that
question was "124". It appears he simply must have made a typo.
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Note: Incorrect answers are highlighted in red. Student 2 received 10/20 on the
Midterm 3, and 19/20 on Final. Student 2 took 37 minutes and 13 seconds on Final
exam, excluding question 7. Order of questions students receive in each exam are
randomized for each student. The student has to save his answers to continue to the
next question.
How did these students cheat? The most likely explanation is that they used
online resources, where private tutors helped them solve problems. In fact, we have
found evidence that the answer key for the Final Exam was distributed online in a
common web platform. For a price of several dollars, students could get access to
the solution key. Once the student obtained the solution key, the only task they
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would need to complete would be to type in the answers for the questions they were
presented in a random order.17
Why did these students cheat? They had a lot to gain. Had they not cheated,
they were very likely to fail the class. Student 1 had accumulated an overall score of
47.8/100 and Student 2 had 53.5/100 before the Final Exam. Their only chance to
pass the class (getting at least 70) was to perform extraordinarily well on the Final
Exam. Having received 95/100 each on the Final Exam, both students would pass
the class. The students’ relative performances on Figure 1.6 and Figures 10 and 11
show their extraordinary performance on the Final Exam relative to the rest of the
class. Furthermore, these students performed even more remarkably compared to
students who took the very same course within the past 10 years. Figure 1.8 shows
how students − who accumulated a failing score up to the final exam − performed on
the final exams given since 2010. Out of 68 such students, only 4 managed to secure
a high enough score to attain a passing letter grade. These students are Students 1
and 2, as well as two other students from the same section in 2020.
Note that there is nothing that stops students to type in their answers "slowly"
which would mimic a case with no cheating. It appears these two students were not
aware that their Access Logs had timestamps showing how much time they spent on
each question. Had they known, they would have most likely submitted their answers
in a longer time period so that their Access Log would look perfectly "normal". Thus
it is essential that any information on the "cheating-detection" tools the instructors
possess be kept private. Once these tools are public knowledge, they become useless
in detecting cheating.
17It would potentially take 15-20 seconds to identify what question comes up on
the screen and match it with the solution key they have at hand since the order of
the questions is randomized for each student.
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Note: Both Students 1 & 2 gave the same incorrect answer of "125". This question
was by far the most difficult question on the exam with a correct response rate of
only 19.3%. The third student who submitted "125" scored 18/20 on the exam. His
other incorrect answer was "12", and the correct answer for that question was "124".
It appears he simply must have made a typo.
Figure 1.5 All responses for the question both Students 1 & 2 made their only
mistake on
Note: Midterms 1 and 2 were held face-to-face with proctoring; Midterm 3 and the
Final Exam were held online asynchronously without proctoring following COVID-19
related campus closures. Each dot represents a student’s test score.
Figure 1.6 Student 1 & 2’s performance relative to the rest of the class
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Notes: All exams before 2020 were held face-to-face with in-class proctoring.
Midterms 1 and 2 in 2020 were held face-to-face at the beginning of Spring 2020
before the COVID-19 related campus closures. Midterm 3 and the Final exams in
2020 were held online.
Figure 1.7 Performance across years (for students who took the final exam)
Note: Total # of students across 10 years with a score <60 up to final exam and
manage to pass the course with a C is only 4. These students are Student 1, Student
2, Student 3 (and the fourth student from the same section.) Student 3 gave identical
answer keys (with 1 exception) with Students 1 and 2.
Figure 1.8 Score distribution on all final exams given between 2010-2020 for
students with a score <60 before the final exam
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We have presented two specific cases with compelling cheating evidence during the
Final Exam. Could it be true that cheating was not limited to these particular cases?
The same version of the course was given several times in the past all with proctored
in-class exams. Figure 1.7 shows the students’ performance across exams since 2010.
To compare the performance of students in Spring 2020 with past students who
took the course, we use the following simple specification,
Scorei,s,j = α0 + α1(Treat×Midterm2)s,j + α2(Treat×Midterm3)s,j+
α3(Treat× Final)s,j + α4Treats + ηj + εi,s,j (1.2)
where Scorei,s,j is the exam score of student i in section s in exam j; Treats = 1
if the section is from Spring 2020; Midterm2j, Midterm3j, Finalj are indicators
for the corresponding exams; ηj is exam fixed-effects; εi,s,j is the idiosyncratic shock.
Midterm 1 is taken as the baseline.
It appears that more than two students may have cheated on the Final Exam.
Table 1.3 shows how two sections from Spring 2020 performed across exams compared
to the previous students who took the very same course. Column 1 compares 2020
Section 1 students to the past students. Similarly, column 2 compares 2020 Section
2 students to past students. Both sections performed worse on Midterms 2 and 3
compared to past students.18 However on the Final Exam, Section 1 outperformed
the past students by approximately 4.3 points while Section 2 still performed slightly
worse. This means that on average, a student in Section 1 received almost one higher
letter grade on the Final Exam than their past counterparts.
18The exams were designed such that the difficulty of each exam goes up moving
from the first Midterm to the Final Exam. In addition, all past students received
multiple choice questions while the students from Spring 2020 received a similar set
of questions with no multiple choice options, but instead were asked to type in their
answers.
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These findings suggest that combined with incentives and peer-effects in cheating,
there may also be a learning process in cheating. There appears to be no evidence
of cheating on Midterm 3 − the first online exam − but evidence of cheating exists
on the Final Exam, where gains are much more salient to students for any potential
improvement in their grades.
Table 1.3 Exam score differences comparing online vs. face-to-face delivery from
past 10 years
outcome: exam score (1) (2)
Section 1 Section 2
Midterm 2 -7.183*** -7.183***
(1.732) (1.732)






Treat×Midterm 2 -10.416*** -5.172**
(1.732) (1.732)





Notes: Section 1 2020 students and Section 2 2020 students are compared with
past 10-year students separately in columns (1)-(2). Baseline is Midterm 1, which
was held face-to-face at the beginning of Spring 2020 before the COVID-19 related
campus closures. Midterm 3 and the Final exam were held online. Students 1 and 2
were enrolled in Section 1. Treat is an indicator for the corresponding online section
in 2020. Exam scores are out of 100 points. Clustered standard errors (clustered by
section) are shown in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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1.5 Conclusion
"I am talking about cheating.
Unfortunately, no one can be
trusted, except maybe for the
top players for whom their




(In response) "Wow. So sad.
The biggest insult ever to all





Like doping, cheating cannot be completely eliminated. There always was, is, and
will be cheating in face-to-face and online examinations. However, we can (try to)
keep it at an “expected equilibrium” level. In this paper, we first looked at two
simple models of face-to-face and online examinations. The theory suggests that
cheating should be expected online. Then, we presented evidence of cheating that
took place in an online examination in Spring 2020 under COVID-19 lockdowns and
made suggestions on how to mitigate cheating based on the experience accumulated
by online chess communities in the last two decades.
COVID-19 made online chess much more popular since March 2020, and there is a
growing number of online chess tournaments with substantial monetary prizes. This
online chess experience is very similar to the experience of many academic instructors.
The recent evidence suggests that the problem is not only there, but it is getting
worse. In the intermediate Section B (1401-1700) of the recent European Online
Chess Championship, 5 out of the top 6 players have been banned for cheating. The
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comment of International Grandmaster Nigel Short, FIDE Vice-President, on May
25, 2020 is revealing: "This scourge will not stop until people are criminally prosecuted
for fraud." Whether people indeed be prosecuted or not, one thing is clear: there is
no chance to win a prize in an online chess event without proctoring if you do not
cheat because you expect that everybody else will cheat and this belief is fulfilled in
a bad equilibrium where everybody cheats. Of course, some people are disqualified,
but not all.
What does this mean for online exams? If instructors curve their grades, then they
create a competition among students similar to what is seen in chess tournaments.
Now, each student has more incentives to cheat because if they believe that the rest
of the group is cheating, then they must demonstrate better than at least average
class performance in order to pass the class. Thus, a student’s chance to pass the
class without cheating would be very slim. Of course in this case, the cost of cheating
goes down because the alternative to not cheating is failing the class. Therefore, any
grade curving should not be used for online teaching.
If universities decide to implement online exams with no proctoring in the up-
coming semesters, we expect that there will be widespread cheating among students,
who will not be penalized since it is almost impossible to present definitive evidence
of cheating in an online exam. Unlike in online chess platforms, it will be difficult to
implement our second suggestion for public universities that the instructors should be
allowed to make the final decision for students who refuse to use a camera. Therefore,
universities should implement a uniform online exam policy where a camera captur-
ing each student’s computer screen and room is a requirement. A camera will also
help to check a student’s ID and eliminate the possibility of another person taking
the test.19 For instructors, in addition to not curving any grades, we also suggest to
19See a discussion on this issue https://www.michigandaily.com/section/academics/
university-faculty-and-students-discuss-academic-integrity-digital-classroom
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give students less time but easier questions to increase the value of time, making it
more costly to cheat.
Figure 1.9 shows a rise in cheating in the world’s largest online chess platform since
shutdowns due to COVID-19 began. Today, several online chess tournaments have a
policy that requires participants to use a camera to live-stream and record themselves
during the tournament.20 Figure 1.10 shows such setup used in a recent online chess
tournament.21 Players live-stream from a side-angle camera showing their screen
and surroundings with their microphone enabled. Even though this method cannot
eliminate all cheating, we believe it is a great balance between having no proctoring
and using online proctoring services.22
Of course, the problem is much bigger, as was noted by Peter Heine Nielsen, Coach
of World Chess Champion Magnus Carlsen, on May 25, 2020: "The same could be
said about corruption, pre-arranged games, buying of votes, jobs going to friends or
political allies instead of an open recruitment procedure based on merits etc. These
are big issues for the chess world, not a 1400-1700 online event."
20See the regulations for a recent online chess event held in Spring 2020 and the
regulations for an upcoming online chess event to be held in Fall 2020.
21Must be on Zoom (use real name) to be eligible for prizes (side/rear camera
angle).
22Online proctoring services are often associated with privacy concerns re-
lated to the use and storage of personal data. These services are also crit-
icized for their use of the "AI" and created petitions against using them.







Figure 1.9 Account closures on Chess.com since shutdowns due to COVID-19 began
Source: https://ruchess.ru/news/report/sokhranyaya_distantsiyu
Figure 1.10 An arbiter monitoring chess players
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Chapter 2
The Queen’s Gambit: Explaining the Superstar
Effect Using Evidence from Chess1
2.1 Introduction
"When you play against Bobby
[Fischer], it is not a question of
whether you win or lose. It is a
question of whether you
survive."
−Boris Spassky, World Chess
Champion, 1969 - 1972.
Maximizing their employees’ efforts is one of the chief goals of the firm. To this
extent, firms typically encourage competition among their employees and allocate
bonuses according to their performance and effort. At the same time, firms want to
hire the best workers – preferably, the ones who are “superstars” in their fields. For
this reason, it is not unusual to see million-dollar hiring contracts among the Forbes
top 500 firms.
However, hiring a superstar employee might potentially cause unintentional side
effects. Brown (2011) took a creative approach to analyze these potential side ef-
fects by considering a famous golf superstar: Tiger Woods. Her goal was to uncover
whether Tiger Woods had a positive or negative effect on his competitors’ perfor-
mance. She compared performances in tournaments with and without Tiger Woods
1Eren Bilen with Alexander Matros.
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and unveiled that there was a sharp decline in performance in tournaments where
Tiger Woods competed. This evidence points out that Tiger Woods, as a superstar,
creates a psychological pressure on his competitors which has a discouraging effect,
causing them to perform worse than their typical performance.
In this paper, we analyze the superstar effect using chess data.2 Chess provides
a clean setting to analyze the superstar effect for the following reasons: First, non-
player related factors are minimal to non-existent in chess since every chess board is
the same for all players.3 Second, the move-level performance indicators can be ob-
tained with the use of computer algorithms that can evaluate the quality of each move
and estimate the complexity of each unique position. Third, multiple chess super-
stars exist who lived in different time periods and come from different backgrounds,
enhancing the external validity of the study.4
To begin with, we present a two-player contest model with a "superstar." Our
theory suggests that the skill gap between the superstar and the other player is
crucial to determine the superstar effect on the competition. If this gap is small,
then the superstar effect is positive: both players exert high effort. However, when
2There is growing literature studying a broad range of questions using data from
chess competitions. For example, Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2011) test whether chess
masters are better at making backward induction decisions. Gerdes and Gränsmark
(2010) test for gender differences in risk-taking using evidence from chess games
played between male and female players, where they find that women choose more
risk-averse strategies playing against men. On the one hand, Backus et al. (2016) and
Smerdon et al. (2020) find that female players make more mistakes playing against
male opponents with similar strength. On the other hand, Stafford (2018) has an
opposite finding that women perform better against men with similar Elo ratings.
Dreber, Gerdes, and Gränsmark (2013) test the relationship between attractiveness
and risk-taking using chess games.
3There is no compelling reason to expect a systematic difference in the environ-
mental factors to directly affect a tournament performance. However, Künn, Palacios,
and Pestel (2019) and Klingen and Ommeren (2020) find that indoor air quality has
effects on performance and risk-taking behavior of chess players.
4In the media, "The Queen’s Gambit" gives a realistic portrayal of a chess su-
perstar. The protagonist, Beth Harmon, is a superstar who dominates her peers in
tournaments. In this paper, we analyze the real-life chess superstar effect on their
peers in actual tournaments.
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the skill gap is large, the superstar effect is negative: both players lower their efforts.
Our theory provides explanations for different superstar effects in the literature. The
negative superstar effect in golf is found not only in Brown (2011), but also in Tanaka
and Ishino (2012)5, while the positive superstar effect in track and field events is
found in Hill (2014). He compares the performance of athletes in runs where Usain
Bolt is competing and where Usain Bolt is not present, finding that athletes perform
much better when Usain Bolt is competing. This can be attributed to non-superstar
athletes being motivated by having Usain Bolt running just “within their reach”,
enabling them to push one step further and show extra effort.
Then, we test our theory on six different male and female chess superstars who
come from different backgrounds and time periods: Magnus Carlsen, Garry Kasparov,
Anatoly Karpov, Bobby Fischer, Hou Yifan, and Igors Rausis.6 We are looking
for direct (individual competition with a superstar) and indirect (performance in a
tournament with a superstar) superstar effects in chess tournaments. To find these
effects, we analyze 2.8 million move-level observations from elite chess tournaments
that took place between 1962 to 2019 with the world’s top chess players. Our main
performance indicator is unique to chess: the "Average Centipawn Loss" (ACPL),
which shows the amount of error a player commits in a game.7 In chess, a player’s
goal is to find the optimal move(s). Failing to do so would result in mistake(s), which
the ACPL metric captures. Having multiple mistakes committed in a game almost
certainly means losing at the top level chess tournaments. We then test the following
hypotheses:
5Their superstar is Masashi Ozaki who competed in the Japan Golf Tour and
dominated the tournaments he participated in throughout the 1990s.
6We discuss why these players are superstars in Section 3.
7The Average Centipawn Loss is also referred to as "mean-error". We provide
details on how we use this metric in Section 3.4.
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1. Direct effect: Do players commit more mistakes (than they are expected to)
playing head-to-head against a superstar?
2. Indirect effect: Do players commit more mistakes (than they are expected to)
in games played against each other if a superstar is present in the tournament
as a competitor?
Holding everything else constant, a player should be able to show the same per-
formance in finding the best moves in two "similarly complex" chess positions. The
difficulty of finding the optimal moves − assuming players show full effort − is re-
lated to two main factors: (1) External factors impacting a player. For instance, being
under pressure can lead the player to choke, resulting in more mistakes. (2) The com-
plexity of the position that the player faces. If both players are willing to take risks,
they can opt to keep more complex positions on the board, which raises the likelihood
that a player commits a mistake. To isolate the "choking effect", we construct a com-
plexity metric using a state-of-the art Artificial Neural Network (ANN) algorithm
that is trained with an independent sample with more than 2 million moves.8 By
controlling board complexity, we compare games with identical difficulty levels. If a
player commits more mistakes against the superstar (or in the presence of a super-
star) in similarly complex games, it must be that either (i) the player chokes under
pressure (that is, even if the player shows full effort, the mental pressure of competing
against a superstar results in under-performance) or (ii) the player gives up and does
not show full effort, considering his or her ex-ante low winning chances (this results
in lower performance with more mistakes committed), or both (i) and (ii).
We find a strong direct superstar effect: in similarly complex games, players
commit more mistakes and perform below their expected level when they compete
head-to-head against the superstar. This result can be explained by both the choking
8The details of the algorithm are provided in Section 3.5.
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and the giving up effects. Consequently, players are less likely to win and more likely
to lose in these games compared to their games against other opponents.
We show that the indirect superstar effect depends on the skill gap between
the superstar and the competition. As our theory predicts, we find that if this gap is
small, the indirect superstar effect is positive: it seems that the players believe they
indeed have a chance to win the tournament and exert higher effort. The data shows
that the top 25 percent of the tournament participants improve their performances
and commit fewer mistakes. However, if the skill gap is large, then the indirect
superstar effect is negative: it seems that players believe that their chances to win
the tournament are slim, and/or that competing at the same tournament with a
superstar creates psychological pressure. As a result, the top players show an under-
performance with more mistakes and more losses. Interestingly, there is a tendency
for the top players to play more complex games in tournaments with a superstar.
This suggests that the choking effect is more dominant than the giving up effect.
Our results provide clear takeaways for organizations: hiring a superstar can have
potential spillover effects, which could be positive for the whole organization if the
superstar is slightly better than the rest of the group. However, the organization can
experience negative spillover effects if the skill gap between the superstar and the
rest of the group is substantial. Thus, managers should compare the marginal benefit
of hiring an "extreme" superstar to the potential spillover costs on the whole orga-
nization.9 Moreover, hiring a marginally-better superstar can act as a performance
inducer for the rest of the team.
The superstar literature started from Rosen (1981), who makes the first contribu-
tion in the understanding of "superstars" by pointing out how skills in certain markets
become excessively valuable. One of the most recent theoretical contributions in the
9Mitigating the negative effects by avoiding within-organization pay-for-
performance compensation schemes is a possibility. However, it is challenging to
eliminate all competition in an organization.
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"superstar" literature is Xiao (2020), who demonstrates the possibility of having pos-
itive or negative incentive effects when a superstar participates in a tournament.
These effects depend on the prize structure and the participants’ abilities.
Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983),
and Moldovanu and Sela (2001) describe how to design optimal contracts in rank-
order tournaments. Prendergast (1999) provides a review on incentives in workplaces.
The empirical sports superstar literature started from Brown (2011)10 and is rang-
ing from professional track and field competitions to swimming. Yamane and Hayashi
(2015) compare the performance of swimmers who compete in adjacent lanes and find
that the performance of a swimmer is positively affected by the performance of the
swimmer in the adjacent lane. In addition, this effect is amplified by the observabil-
ity of the competitor’s performance. Specifically, in backstroke competitions where
observability of the adjacent lane is minimal, there appears to be no effect, whereas
the effect exists in freestyle competitions with higher observability. Jane (2015) uses
swimming competitions data in Taiwan and finds that having faster swimmers in a
competition increases the overall performance of all the competitors participating in
the competition.
Topcoder and Kaggle are the two largest crowdsourcing platforms where contest
organizers can run online contests offering prizes to contestants who score the best
in finding a solution to a difficult technical problem stated at the beginning of the
contest. Archak (2010) finds that players avoid competing against superstars in
Topcoder competitions. Studying the effect of increased competition on responses
10Connolly and Rendleman (2014) and Babington, Goerg, and Kitchens (2020)
point out that an adverse superstar effect may not be as strong as suggested by
Brown (2011). They claim that this result is not robust to alternative specifications
and suggest that the effect could work in the opposite direction – that the top com-
petitors can perhaps bring forth the best in other players’ performance. In addition,
Babington, Goerg, and Kitchens (2020) provide further evidence using observations
from men’s and women’s FIS World Cup Alpine Skiing competitions and find little to
no peer effects when skiing superstars Hermann Maier and Lindsey Vonn participate
in a tournament. Our theory can suggest an explanation for these findings.
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from the competitors, Boudreau, Lakhani, and Menietti (2016) discover that lower-
ability competitors respond negatively to competition, while higher-ability players
respond positively. Zhang, Shunyuan and Singh, Param Vir and Ghose, Anindya
(2019) suggest that there may potentially be future benefits from competitions with
superstars: the competitors will learn from the superstar. This finding is similar to
the positive peer effects in the workplace and in the classroom, see Mas and Moretti
(2009), Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011), Cornelissen, Dustmann, and Schönberg
(2017), Moreira (2019).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a two-player
tournament model with a superstar. Section 3 gives background information on
chess and describes how chess data is collected and analyzed. Section 4 provides the
empirical design. Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Theory
In this section, we consider a two-player contest in which player 1 competes against a
superstar, player 2.11 Player 1 maximizes his expected payoff, consisting of expected






where ei is the effort of player i = 1, 2, V1 is a (monetary or rating/ranking) prize
which player 1 can win, and θ is the ability of player 2. We normalize the ability







11Tullock (1980) discussed a similar model, but did not provide a formal analysis.
12We assume that costs are linear functions.
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where V2 is the prize that player 2 can win. Note that θ is not only the ability of
player 2, but also the ratio of that player’s abilities.
The first order conditions for players 1 and 2 are
θe2
(e1 + θe2)2




V2 − 1 = 0.






We can state our theoretical results now.
Proposition 1. Suppose that V1 > V2. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium in















We assume that the prize for the underdog is greater than the prize for the super-
star in the two-player contest: everyone expects the superstar to win the competition
and her victory is neither surprising, nor too rewarding. However, the underdog’s
victory makes him special, which is also evident from rating point calculations in
chess: a lower rated player gains more rating points if he wins against a higher
ranked player.13 It follows from proposition 1 that the underdog, player 1, always
exerts higher effort than the superstar, player 2, in the equilibrium, since V1 > V2.
In addition, underdog’s winning chances decrease in the superstar abilities. We have
the following comparative statics results.
13The statement of Proposition 1 holds without the assumption about prizes. We
will need this assumption for the comparative statics results.
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Proposition 2. Suppose that V1 > V2. Then, individual equilibrium efforts increase
in the superstar ability if θ∗ < V1
V2
and decrease if θ∗ > V1
V2
.
Individual equilibrium efforts are maximized if the superstar ability is θ∗ = V1
V2
.
Proposition 2 gives a unique value of the superstar ability which maximizes indi-
vidual and total equilibrium efforts. This observation suggests the best ability of a
superstar for the contest designer.
Figure 2.1 illustrates this proposition and shows how equilibrium efforts and win-
ning probabilities change for different levels of superstar abilities if V1 = 10 and
V2 = 4. When the ability ratio is small, effort levels for both players increase. As
the ability ratio increases, both players decrease their efforts. In other words, if the
gap between the superstar and the underdog abilities is small, the superstar effect is
positive as both players exert higher efforts. However, if the superstar is much better
than the underdog, then both players shirk in their efforts and the superstar effect is
negative.





"It is an entire world of just 64
squares."
−Beth Harmon, The Queen’s
Gambit, Netflix Mini-Series
(2020)
Chess is a two-player game with origins dating back to 6th century AD. Chess is
played over a 8x8 board with 16 pieces for each side (8 pawns, 2 knights, 2 bishops, 2
rooks, 1 queen, and 1 king). Figure 2.2 shows a chess board. Players make moves in
turns, and the player with the white pieces moves first. The ultimate goal of the game
is to capture the enemy king. A player can get close to this goal by threatening the
king through a "check": if the king has no escape, the game ends with a "checkmate".
A game can end in three ways: white player wins, black player wins, or the game









a b c d e f g h
Figure 2.2 A chess board
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The possible combinations of moves in a chess game is estimated to be more than
the number of atoms in the universe.14 However, some moves are better than others.
With years of vigorous training, professional chess players learn how to find the best
moves by employing backward-induction and calculating consequences of moves to a
certain complexity level. Failing to find the best move(s) in a position would result in
a "blunder" or a "mistake" which typically leads to the player losing their game at the
top level if a player commits multiple blunders or mistakes. The player who performs
better overall is the player who manages to find the correct moves more often.
The standard measure of player strength in chess is the Elo rating system first
adopted by FIDE in 1970. This system was created by the Hungarian physicist Arpad
Elo (Elo 1978). Elo considers the performance of a player in a given game as a random
variable normally distributed around the unobservable true ability. Each player gets
a starting Elo rating which is updated according to the outcome of each game via
ELOR,t+1 = ELOR,t +K [Si − Et (Si | Ri, Rj)] , (2.1)
where Si is the outcome of a game such that Si = 1 if player i wins the game, Si = 0
if player i loses the game, and Si = 1/2 if the game ended in a draw. Et (Si | Ri, Rj)
is the expected probability of player i winning the game given the Elo ratings of the





where Φ(.) is the
c.d.f. of the normal distribution.15 K is a parameter for rate of adjustment.
This rating system allows comparisons of players’ strengths. For instance, every
month, FIDE publishes Elo ratings of all chess players. The Top 10 players are
14A lower bound on the number of possible moves is 10120 moves, per Shannon
(1950) while the number of atoms in the observable universe is estimated to be roughly
1080.
15The probability that player i wins a game against player j is a function of their
true abilities. Let pi be the performance of player i, with pi ∼ N(µi, σ2) and pi i =
1, , ..n independent of each other. Player i wins if P (pi > pj) or P (pi − pj > 0).





















where z is the standard normal.
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considered the most elite players in the world who earn significant amounts of prizes
and sponsorships. Moreover, chess titles have specific Elo rating requirements. For
instance, the highest title in chess, Grandmaster, requires the player to have an Elo
rating 2500 or higher.16
Over the past decades, computer scientists have developed algorithms, or "chess
engines" that exploit the game-tree structure of chess. These engines analyze each
possible tree branch to come up with the best moves. The early chess engines were
inferior to humans. After a few decades, however, one chess engine developed by IBM
in the 1990s, Deep Blue, famously defeated the world chess champion at the time,
Garry Kasparov, in 1997. This was the first time a world chess champion lost to a
chess engine under tournament conditions. Since then, chess engines have passed well
beyond the human skills. As of 2021, Stockfish 11 is the strongest chess engine with
an Elo rating of 3497.17 In comparison, the current world chess champion, Magnus
Carlsen, has an Elo rating of 2862.18
In addition to finding the best moves in a given position, a chess engine can be
used to analyze the games played between human players.19 The quality of a move can
be measured numerically by evaluating the move chosen by a player and comparing
it to the list of moves suggested by the chess engine. If the move played by a player
16Our sample consists of the very elite chess players, often called "Super GMs",
with Elo ratings higher than 2700 in most cases.
17Modern chess engines, such as Stockfish, have much higher Elo ratings compared
to humans. Most modern computers are strong enough to run Stockfish for analyzing
chess positions and finding the best moves, which is the engine we use in our analyses.
18The highest Elo rating ever achieved by a human was 2882 in May 2014 by
Magnus Carlsen.
19Every chess game played at the top level is recorded, including all the moves
played by the players.
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is considered a bad move by the engine, then that move is assigned a negative value
with its magnitude depending on the engine’s evaluation.20
2.3.2 Chess Superstars
The first official world chess champion is Wilhelm Steinitz who won the title in 1886.
Since Steinitz, there have been sixteen world chess champions in total. Among these
sixteen players, four have shown an extraordinary dominance over their peers: Mag-
nus Carlsen, Garry Kasparov, Anatoly Karpov, and Bobby Fischer.21 We present
evidence why these players were so dominant and considered "superstars" in their
eras. Specifically, we define a superstar as a player who satisfies the following con-
ditions: (i) be the world chess champion; (ii) win at least 50% of all tournaments
participated in;22 (iii) maintain an Elo rating at least 50 points above the average Elo
rating of the world’s top 10 players (this condition must hold for the post-1970 era
when Elo rating was introduced); (iv) have such a high ELO rating that just winning
an elite tournament is not sufficient to gain Elo rating points. We define an elite
tournament, a tournament which has (1) at least two players from the world’s Top 10
and (2) the average Elo rating in the tournament is within 50 points of the average
Elo rating in tournaments with a superstar.
Magnus Carlsen is the current world chess champion, who first became cham-
pion in 2013 at age 22. He reached the highest Elo rating ever achieved in history.
20Engine evaluation scores in chess have no impact on the game outcomes. Engines
are used in post-game analysis for learning and research purposes. They are also used
during live broadcasting, such that the audience can see which player maintains an
advantage. Using a computer engine by a player during a game is against fair play
rules and is equivalent to using Performance Enhancing Drugs (PEDs) in other sports.
21In his classic series, "My Great Predecessors", Kasparov (2003) gives in-depth
explanations about his predecessors, outlining qualities of each world champion before
him. In this paper, we consider the "greatest of the greatest" world champions as
"superstars" in their eras.
22For comparison, Tiger Woods won 24.2 percent of the PGA Tour events he at-
tended.
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Garry Kasparov was the world champion from 1985-2000 and was the number one
ranked chess player for 255 months, setting a record for maintaining the number one
position for the longest duration of time. Anatoly Karpov was the world champion
before Kasparov in the years 1975-1985. He won over 160 tournaments, which is a
record for the highest number of tournaments won by a chess player.23 Bobby Fis-
cher was the world champion before Karpov between 1972 - 1975, winning all U.S.
championships he played in from 1957 (at age 14) to 1966. Fischer won the 1963 U.S.
chess championship with a perfect 11 out of 11 score, a feat no other player has ever
achieved.24
In addition to the four male superstars, we consider a female chess superstar: Hou
Yifan, a four time women’s world chess champion between the years 2010-2017. She
played three women’s world chess championship matches in this period and did not
lose a single game against her opponents, dominating the tournaments from 2014
until she decided to stop playing competitively in 2017.
Figures 2.5–2.9 show how the four world chess champions: Carlsen, Kasparov,
Karpov and Hou Yifan performed compared to their peers across years.25 The Elo
23Kasparov (2003) shares an observation on Karpov’s effect on other players during
a game in Moscow in 1974: "Tal, who arrived in the auditorium at this moment, gives
an interesting account: "The first thing that struck me (I had not yet seen the position)
was this: with measured steps Karpov was calmly walking from one end of the stage to
the other. His opponent was sitting with his head in his hands, and simply physically
it was felt that he was in trouble. ’Everything would appear to be clear,’ I thought to
myself, ’things are difficult for Polugayevsky.’ But the demonstration board showed
just the opposite! White was a clear exchange to the good − about such positions
it is customary to say that the rest is a matter of technique. Who knows, perhaps
Karpov’s confidence, his habit of retaining composure in the most desperate situations,
was transmitted to his opponent and made Polugayevsky excessively nervous." p. 239
"My Great Predecessors" Vol 5.
24Kasparov (2003) on Fischer’s performance in 1963 U.S. championship: "Bobby
crushed everyone in turn, Reshevsky, Steinmeyer, Addison, Weinstein, Donald
Byrne... Could no one really withstand him?! In an interview Evans merely spread
his hands: ’Fantastic, unbelievable...’ Fischer created around himself such an en-
ergy field, such an atmosphere of tension, a colossal psychological intensity, that this
affected everyone." See p. 310 "My Great Predecessors" Vol 4.
25Elo rating information is not available for Fischer’s era. FIDE adopted the Elo
rating system in 1970.
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rating difference between each superstar and the average of world’s top 10 players in
each corresponding era is about 100 points.26 Figures 2.10–2.14 show individual tour-
nament performances across years for each superstar with the vertical axis showing
gains/losses of rating points at the end of a tournament. For instance in 2001, Kas-
parov played in four tournaments and won all of them. In one of these tournaments,
he lost rating points despite winning. For the world’s strongest player, winning a
tournament is not sufficient to maintain or gain rating points because he also has to
win decisively.
We also consider a chess grandmaster, Igors Rausis, who competed against non-
masters in the years between 2012-2019. He was in the top 100 chess players in the
world and played against players about 500 Elo rating points below his rating.27 Fig-
ure 2.15 illustrates an example of the Elo rating distribution of Rausis’ opponents in
a tournament. His participation in such tournaments created a unique setting where
a strong chess grandmaster plays against much lower rated non-master opponents.28
Table 2.1 presents statistics of the superstars’ dominance. Panels A-E include
the World’s Top 10 chess players for the corresponding era and a summary of their
tournament performances. For example, Magnus Carlsen participated in 35 tourna-
ments with classical time controls between 2013 and 2019, winning 21 of them. This
60% tournament win rate is two times higher than World’s #2 chess player, Fabiano
Caruana, who has a tournament win rate of 30%. A more extreme case is Anatoly
Karpov, who won 26 out of 32 tournaments, which converts to an 81% tournament
win rate while the runner up Jan Timman had a tournament win rate of 22%.
26This rating gap is very significant, especially at top-level competitive chess. For
instance, the expected win probabilities between two players with a gap of 100 Elo
rating points are approximately 64%-36%.
27The rating difference between him and his average opponent in the tournaments is
similar to the rating difference between the current world champion Magnus Carlsen,
with Elo rating of 2882, and the chess engine Stockfish 11, with Elo rating 3497.
28Igors Rausis was banned by FIDE, the International Chess Federation, in July
2019 due to cheating by using a chess engine on his phone during tournaments.
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Table 2.1 World’s Top 10 chess players and their tournament performances




















ACPL complexity # ofmoves
# of
games
Carlsen, Magnus 21 35 60% 2855 0.352 0.576 0.072 14.413 26.802 16,104 303
Caruana, Fabiano 15 49 30% 2802 0.283 0.592 0.126 16.758 28.280 22,205 447
So, Wesley 6 28 21% 2777 0.226 0.666 0.108 14.928 25.717 11,622 263
Aronian, Levon 5 33 15% 2788 0.196 0.662 0.142 16.059 25.654 13,455 294
Mamedyarov, Shakh. 4 24 16% 2777 0.172 0.674 0.154 15.050 26.339 9,405 216
Giri, Anish 3 32 9% 2770 0.149 0.719 0.131 14.873 26.202 14,224 304
Karjakin, Sergey 3 29 10% 2768 0.168 0.689 0.143 15.947 26.938 12,764 281
Nakamura, Hikaru 3 35 8% 2779 0.218 0.622 0.160 15.823 27.398 15,349 327
Vachier L, Maxime 3 27 11% 2777 0.163 0.703 0.134 14.539 26.842 10,227 232
Grischuk, Alexander 0 16 0% 2777 0.183 0.633 0.184 18.081 27.539 6,852 146




















ACPL complexity # ofmoves
# of
games
Kasparov, Garry 17 22 77% 2816 0.439 0.510 0.051 17.595 28.509 18,082 488
Kramnik, Vladimir 12 30 40% 2760 0.322 0.621 0.058 16.743 26.071 22,782 610
Anand, Viswanathan 9 25 36% 2762 0.305 0.595 0.099 19.337 28.328 18,879 517
Topalov, Veselin 6 26 23% 2708 0.279 0.514 0.207 21.193 22,081 28.801 515
Ivanchuk, Vassily 4 17 23% 2727 0.255 0.582 0.164 19.626 27.045 13,673 362
Adams, Michael 3 22 13% 2693 0.255 0.575 0.169 19.096 27.382 17,472 421
Short, Nigel D 3 18 16% 2673 0.272 0.475 0.253 22.717 29.080 13,538 348
Svidler, Peter 3 13 23% 2684 0.234 0.599 0.167 19.340 27.573 9,458 260
Karpov, Anatoly 2 12 16% 2742 0.214 0.679 0.107 18.292 26.457 8,966 211
Shirov, Alexei 2 26 7% 2706 0.288 0.460 0.253 21.865 29.014 22,277 529
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Table 1 (cont): World’s Top 10 chess players and their tournament performances




















ACPL complexity # ofmoves
# of
games
Karpov, Anatoly 26 32 81% 2707 0.432 0.524 0.044 17.429 25.244 14,581 391
Timman, Jan 7 32 21% 2607 0.333 0.525 0.142 20.777 26.074 17,690 305
Larsen, Bent 5 27 18% 2607 0.383 0.342 0.274 23.726 27.251 17,495 193
Kasparov, Garry 3 5 60% 2652 0.429 0.487 0.084 20.459 25.634 2,207 53
Portisch, Lajos 3 20 15% 2634 0.324 0.516 0.160 20.471 25.729 10,744 204
Tal, Mihail 3 11 27% 2632 0.271 0.652 0.077 19.898 24.915 5,505 131
Petrosian, Tigran 2 12 16% 2608 0.244 0.652 0.103 20.810 23.089 5,257 100
Spassky, Boris 2 16 12% 2624 0.196 0.697 0.107 19.789 24.771 6,115 157
Beliavsky, Alexander 1 5 20% 2596 0.320 0.457 0.223 23.923 28.210 2,758 58
Kortschnoj, Viktor 1 2 50% 2672 0.558 0.292 0.150 22.860 28.550 1,106 23




















ACPL complexity # ofmoves
# of
games
Fischer, R. James 12 16 75% . 0.641 0.286 0.073 18.405 28.622 10,706 252
Kortschnoj, Viktor 7 12 58% . 0.469 0.459 0.072 19.964 26.378 7,728 197
Keres, Paul 4 10 40% . 0.420 0.547 0.032 19.080 25.084 4,830 139
Spassky, Boris 4 10 40% . 0.410 0.570 0.020 18.240 24.341 4,365 138
Botvinnik, Mikhail 3 5 60% . 0.529 0.414 0.056 18.769 26.065 2,251 63
Geller, Efim 2 12 16% . 0.425 0.506 0.069 18.519 25.024 8,432 220
Tal, Mihail 2 10 20% . 0.466 0.402 0.133 21.894 26.928 4,615 123
Petrosian, Tigran 2 14 14% . 0.334 0.621 0.045 20.311 24.675 7,622 227
Reshevsky, Samuel 1 13 7% . 0.258 0.505 0.237 24.871 25.505 5,253 140
Bronstein, David 0 7 0% . 0.283 0.628 0.089 21.604 25.199 3,043 94
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Table 1 (cont): World’s Top 10 chess players and their tournament performances




















ACPL complexity # ofmoves
# of
games
Hou, Yifan 4 4 100% 2644 0.614 0.364 0.023 16.222 26.820 4,028 88
Ju, Wenjun 3 6 50% 2563 0.400 0.523 0.077 16.565 26.079 5,826 130
Koneru, Humpy 2 6 33% 2584 0.379 0.424 0.197 20.033 27.516 5,832 132
Dzagnidze, Nana 0 6 0% 2540 0.359 0.347 0.295 24.728 28.335 6,080 128
Goryachkina, A 0 1 0% 2564 0.364 0.636 0.000 14.322 27.547 1,116 22
Kosteniuk, A 0 7 0% 2532 0.297 0.508 0.195 22.841 29.092 6,878 150
Lagno, Kateryna 0 2 0% 2544 0.227 0.682 0.091 16.283 26.304 1,666 44
Muzychuk, Anna 0 5 0% 2554 0.218 0.582 0.200 18.416 26.901 4,814 110
Muzychuk, Mariya 0 3 0% 2544 0.242 0.576 0.182 18.302 27.178 3,056 66
Zhao, Xue 0 6 0% 2519 0.288 0.424 0.288 24.058 27.521 5,990 132




















ACPL complexity # ofmoves
# of
games
Rausis, Igors 8 8 100% 2578 0.783 0.217 0.000 18.319 25.436 3,864 105
Naumkin, Igor 1 4 25% 2444 0.667 0.228 0.106 24.891 26.162 1,746 48
Patuzzo, Fabrizio 1 3 33% 2318 0.600 0.133 0.267 28.208 26.425 1,322 25
Reinhardt, Bernd 1 4 25% 2207 0.423 0.215 0.362 32.870 27.644 1,299 27
Bardone, Lorenzo 0 3 0% 2095 0.433 0.267 0.300 27.199 26.779 890 24
Gascon Nogal, J R 0 2 0% 2469 0.625 0.250 0.125 23.560 28.387 1,162 32
Lubbe, Melanie 0 4 0% 2316 0.401 0.263 0.336 25.243 25.287 1,730 40
Lubbe, Nikolas 0 4 0% 2467 0.527 0.442 0.031 24.480 25.623 1,676 48
Luciani, Valerio 0 4 0% 2158 0.485 0.083 0.432 35.437 27.656 1,352 35
Montilli, Vincenzo 0 3 0% 2117 0.311 0.422 0.267 32.871 26.972 1,278 26
Notes: Panels A-E show the tournament performance for the World’s Top 10 chess players for the corresponding time period. Elo rating
was first adopted by the International Chess Federation (FIDE) in 1970, hence this information is absent in Panel D. Variables and their
definitions are presented in Table B.1.
∗: Panel F shows the tournament performance for Rausis and his top performing opponents.
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2.3.3 ChessBase Mega Database
Our data comes from the 2020 ChessBase Mega Database containing over 8 million
chess games dating back to the 1400s. Every chess game is contained in a PGN
file which includes information about player names, player sides (White or Black),
Elo ratings, date and location of the game, tournament name, round, and the moves
played. An example of a PGN file and a tournament table is provided in the appendix.
See Table B.2 and Figure B.1.
Table B.1 in the appendix provides a summary of variables used and their def-
initions. Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics for each era with tournaments
grouped according to the superstar presence. In total, our study analyzes over 2 mil-
lion moves from approximately 35,000 games played in over 300 tournaments between
1962 and 2019.29
2.3.4 Measuring Performance
Our first metric comes from computer evaluations where we identify mistakes com-
mitted by each player in a given game.30 A chess game g consists of moves m ∈
{1, . . . ,M} where player i makes an individual move mig. A chess engine can evalu-
ate a given position by calculating layers with depth n at each decision node and make
suggestions about the best moves to play. Given a best move is played, the engine
provides the relative (dis)advantage in a given position Ccomputerigm . This evaluation is
then compared to the actual evaluation score Cplayerigm once a player makes his or her
move. The difference in scores reached via the engine’s top suggested move(s) and
the actual move a player makes can be captured by
errorigm =
∣∣∣Ccomputerigm − Cplayerigm ∣∣∣ . (2.2)
29A list of the tournaments is provided in the appendix.
30Guid and Bratko (2006) and Regan, Biswas, and Zhou (2011) are two early
examples of implementations of computer evaluations in chess.
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If the player makes a top suggested move, the player has committed zero error, i.e.,
Ccomputerigm = C
player
igm . We can think of chess as a game of attrition where the player
who makes less mistakes eventually wins the game. While staying constant if top
moves are played, the evaluation shows an advantage for the opponent if a player
commits a mistake by playing a bad move.




∣∣∣Ccomputerigm − Cplayerigm ∣∣∣
M
, (2.3)
which is a widely accepted metric named Average Centipawn Loss (ACPL). ACPL
is the average of all the penalties a player is assigned by the chess engine for the
mistakes they committed in a game. If the player plays the best moves in a game,
his ACPL score will be small where a smaller number implies the player performed
better. On the other hand, if the player makes moves that are considered bad by the
engine, the player’s ACPL score would be higher.
We used Stockfish 11 in our analysis with depth n = 19 moves. For each move, the
engine was given half a second to analyze the position and assess |Ccomputerigm −C
player
igm |.
Figure 2.16 shows an example of how a game was analyzed. For instance, at move
30, the computer evaluation is +3.2, which means that the white player has the
advantage by a score of 3.2: roughly the equivalent of being one piece (knight or
bishop) up compared to his opponent. If the white player comes up with the best
moves throughout the rest of the game, the evaluation can also stay 3.2 (if the black
player also makes perfect moves) or only go up leading to a possible win toward
the end of the game. In the actual game, the player with the white pieces lost his
advantage by making bad moves and eventually lost the game. The engine analyzes
all 162 moves played in the game and evaluates the quality of each move. Dividing
the sum of mistakes committed by player i to the total number of moves played by
player i gives the player-specific ACPL score.
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Our second measure that reinforces our ACPL metric is "board complexity" which
we obtain via an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) approach. The recent develop-
ments with AlphaGo and AlphaZero demonstrated the strength of using heuristic-
based algorithms that perform at least as good as the traditional approaches, if not
better.31 Instead of learning from self-play, our neural-network algorithm "learns"
from human players.32 To train the network, we use an independent sample pub-
lished as part of a Kaggle contest consisting of 25,000 games and more than 2 million
moves, with Stockfish evaluation included for each move.33 The average player in this
sample has an Elo rating of 2280, which corresponds to the "National Master" level
according to the United States Chess Federation (USCF).34











Figure 2.3 Example of a simple perceptron, with 3 input units (each with its unique
weight) and 1 output unit.
The goal of the network is to predict the probability of a player making a mistake
with its magnitude. This task would be trivial to solve for positions that were previ-
ously played. However, each chess game reaches a unique position after the opening
stage which requires accurate extrapolation of human play in order to predict the
31https://en.chessbase.com/post/leela-chess-zero-alphazero-for-the-pc
32Sabatelli et al. (2018) and McIlroy-Young et al. (2020) are two recent implemen-



































1st hidden layer kth hidden layer
output layer
Figure 2.4 Network graph of a multilayer neural network with (k + 1) layers, N
input units, and 1 output unit. Each neuron collects unique weights from each
previous unit. The kth hidden layer contains m(k) neurons.
errors.35 We represent a chess position through the use of its 12 binary features, cor-
responding to the 12 unique pieces on the board (6 for White, 6 for Black). A chess
board has 8× 8 = 64 squares. We split the board into 12 separate 8× 8 boards (one
for each piece) where a square gets "1" if the piece is present on that particular square
and gets "0" otherwise. In total, we represent a given position using 12× 8× 8 = 768
inputs. We add one additional feature to represent the players’ turn (white to move,
or black to move) and thus have 768+1 = 769 inputs in total per position. Figure 2.4
illustrates.36
35This approach is vastly different than traditional analysis with an engine such
as Stockfish. Engines are very strong and can find the best moves. However, they
cannot give any information about how a human would play in a given situation
because they are designed to find the best moves without any human characteristics.
Our neural-network algorithm is specifically designed to learn how and when humans
make mistakes in given positions from analyzing mistakes committed by humans from
a sample of 2 million moves.
36We use a network architecture with three layers. Figure 2.3 illustrates. The
layers have 1048, 500, and 50 neurons, each with its unique weight. In order to
prevent overfitting, a 20% dropout regularization on each layer is used. Each hidden
layer is connected with the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function. The
Adam optimizer was used with a learning rate of 0.001.
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The neural network "learns" from 25,000 games by observing each of the approx-
imately two million positions and estimates the optimal weights by minimizing the
error rate that results from each possible set of weights with the Gradient Descent
algorithm. The set of 1,356,612 optimal weights uniquely characterizes our network.
We use two networks to make a prediction on two statistics for a given position: (i)
probability that a player commits an error and (ii) the amount of error measured in
centipawns. For a full game, the two statistics multiplied (and averaged out across
moves) gives us an estimate for the ACPL that each player is expected to get as the








∣∣∣Ccomputerigm − Cnetworkigm ∣∣∣ is the expected centipawn loss in a given position pre-
dicted by the neural network. We test our network’s performance on our main "super-
stars" sample.37 The mean ACPL for the whole sample with 35,000 games is 25.87,
and our board complexity measure, which is the expected ACPL that we obtained
through our network, is 26.56.38 Figure 2.19 shows a scatterplot of ACPL and the
expected ACPL. The slope coefficient is 1.14, which implies that a point increase in
our complexity measure results in a 1.14 point increase in the actual ACPL score.39
Figure 2.20 shows the distributions of ACPL and the expected ACPL.
37Figures 2.17–2.18 show our network’s prediction on a game played by Magnus
Carlsen.
38The reason why our network −which was trained with games played at on average
2280 Elo level− makes a close estimate for the ACPL in the main sample is that the
estimates come from not a single player with Elo rating 2280, but rather from a
"committee" of players with Elo rating 2280 on average. Hence the network is slightly
"stronger" compared to an actual 2280 player.
39The highest ACPL prediction of the network is 50.2 while about 8% of the sample
has an actual ACPL > 50.2. These extreme ACPL cases are under-predicted by the
network due to the network’s behavior as a "committee" rather than a single player,
where the idiosyncratic shocks are averaged out.
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The board complexity measure addresses the main drawback of using only ACPL
scores. The ACPL score of a player is a function of his or her opponent’s strength
and their strategic choices. For instance, if both players find it optimal to not take
any risks, they can have a simple game where players make little to no mistakes,
resulting in low ACPL scores. Yet, this would not imply that players showed a great
performance compared to their other −potentially more complex− games. Being
able to control for complexity of a game enables us to compare mistakes committed
in similarly-complex games.
The third measure we use is game-level outcomes. Every chess game ends in a
win, a loss, or a draw. The player who wins a tournament is the one who accumulates
more wins and fewer losses, as the winner of a game receives a full point toward his or
her tournament score.40 In other words, a player who has more wins in a tournament
shows a higher performance. In terms of losses, the opposite is true. If a player
has many losses in a tournament, their chances to win the tournament are slim. Of
course, a draw is considered better than a loss and worse than a win.
2.4 Empirical Design
Our baseline model compares a player’s performance in a tournament where a super-
star is present with their performance in a tournament without a superstar. This can
be captured by the following equation:
Performancei,j = β0 + β1Superstarj ×HighELOi,j + β2Superstarj ×MidELOi,j
+ β3Superstarj × LowELOi,j + β4HighELOi,j + β5MidELOi,j
+ ΘXi,j + ηi + εi,j, (2.5)
where Performancei,j is the performance of player i in tournament j, measured by
methods discussed in section 3.4. Superstarj is an indicator for a superstar being
40A draw brings half a point, while a loss brings no points in a tournament.
51
present in tournament j. εi,j is an idiosyncratic shock. Having negative signs for co-
efficients β1, β2, and β3 means that the superstar presence creates an adverse effect:
players are discouraged to demonstrate their best efforts resulting in worse perfor-
mance outcomes. HighELOi,j equals one if the player has an Elo rating within the
top quartile in the Elo rating distribution of the tournament participants. MidELOi,j
captures the second and third quartiles, and LowELOi,j captures the bottom quartile.
ΘXi,j contains the game and tournament level controls. In addition to tournament
level specifications, chess allows for a game level analysis which can be specified as
the following:
Performancei,j,k = α0 + α1AgainstSuperstari,j,k + ΦXi,j + ηi + εi,j,k, (2.6)
where AgainstSuperstari,j,k equals one if player i in tournament j plays against a
superstar in round k. In this specification, α1 captures the effect of head-to-head
competition against a superstar.
Note that chess superstars as a rule play in the strongest tournaments, which
guarantees more money and higher prestige. However, it is not possible to play in
all top-level tournaments.41 Typically, if a player competes in a world championship
match in a given year, (s)he tends to play in fewer tournaments in that particular
year to be able to prepare for the world championship match.42 In years without
a world championship match, the world champion typically picks a certain number
of tournaments to participate in. (S)he may play in fewer tournaments if (s)he be-
lieves that the schedule does not allow for adequate preparation for each tournament.
41In our sample with elite tournaments, a tournament with a superstar has, on
average, an average Elo score that is 50 points higher compared to the tournaments
without a superstar. This shows that chess superstars indeed play in the strongest
tournaments.
42We indeed document a negative correlation between the number of tournaments
a superstar plays and world championship years. These results are available upon
request.
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We control for the average Elo rating in a tournament to account for any selection
issues.43
2.5 Results
Table 2.3 shows the performance of non-superstar players playing against a superstar
for each sample. There is a distinct pattern that is true for all superstars: playing
against them is associated with a higher ACPL score, more blunders, more mistakes,
lower chances to win, and higher chances to lose. What is more, games played against
superstars are more complex. This higher complexity could be due to the superstar’s
willingness to reach more complex positions in order to make the ability-gap more
salient. It could also be linked to a non-superstar player taking more risk.44 Taken
as a whole, players commit more blunders and mistakes, holding board complexity
constant. For instance, a player who plays against Fischer shows an ACPL that is 4.3
points higher compared to his games against other players with a similar complexity
level. His likelihood is 10 percentage points less for a win, 18 percentage points
less for a draw, and 29 percentage points higher for a loss compared to his typical
games. This implies that in terms of direct competition, these superstars have a strong
dominance over their peers. Rausis, unsurprisingly, and Hou Yifan, surprisingly, show
the strongest domination, with Fischer closely following in third position behind these
43Linnemer and Visser (2016) document self-selection in chess tournaments with
stronger players being more likely to play in tournaments with higher prizes. A
central difference between their sample and ours is the level of tournaments, with
their data coming from the World Open tournament, which is an open tournament
with non-master participants with Elo ratings between 1400-2200. Meanwhile, our
sample consists of players from a much more restricted sample with only the most
elite Grandmasters having Elo ratings often above 2700. Moreover, these high-level
tournaments are invitation based; i.e., tournament organizers offer invitations to a
select group of strong players, with these restrictions working against any possible
selection issues.
44It is not a trivial task to identify which player initiates complexity. Typically,
complex games are reached with mutual agreement by players, avoiding exchanges
and keeping the tension on the board.
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two players. The magnitudes for ACPL, win, and loss probabilities are stronger for
these players compared to the rest of the samples.45
Tables 2.4–2.12 show the effect of a superstar’s presence on the performance of
other competitors. Rausis, the most dominant superstar according to Table 2.3, has a
negative effect on the top players’ performances.46 However, focusing on the last three
rounds − the rounds where the winner is determined by the Swiss pairing format −
a large adverse effect exists for the top players. These players have an ACPL score
that is 2.4 points higher, about 65% higher chances of committing a blunder, and
23% less chances of winning.47 A similar adverse effect on the top players is true for
the second most dominant superstar, Hou Yifan. Her presence is associated with an
ACPL score that is 4.5 points higher, 11% less chances of winning, and 17% higher
chances of losing for the top players in a tournament. For Fischer, the coefficients
for ACPL, blunders, and mistakes are positive but imprecise. Fischer’s opponents
indeed had more draws and less complex-games, which agrees with the findings in
Moul and Nye (2009) on Soviet collusion.
Another situation with intense competition is when two superstars, Kasparov and
Karpov, both participate in a tournament. This means that for a given player, he
or she will have to face both Kasparov and Karpov and perform better than both
of them in order to win the tournament. This tough competition appears to lead
to more decisive games and less draws, with players committing fewer blunders and
mistakes. The top quartile of players, who usually try to compete with Kasparov and
45Taken as a whole, these findings verify that the superstars considered in our study
indeed show greater performance compared to their peers.
46Unsurprisingly, Rausis’ effect on all participants is minimal. The average number
of participants in an open Swiss-format tournament is typically more than fifty with
very heterogeneous participants.
47The top players perform better at the beginning of a tournament with Rausis, and
their motivation appears to vanish toward the end of the tournament when critical
games for the tournament victory are decided. We focus on the latter results due to
higher stakes in the final rounds.
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Karpov, experience a lot of pressure and as a result, increased losses. However, these
players also win more games.48
Players perform better if they face only Kasparov or Karpov in the tournament
compared to facing both superstars in the tournament. With one superstar, either
Kasparov or Karpov, in the tournament, players have higher chances of winning the
tournament and as a result, play more accurately and manage to get more wins, with
substantial gains in the ACPL score and less mistakes committed. This improvement
is the strongest for the top quartile of players.
Surprisingly, Carlsen is the least dominant superstar in our sample because his
presence appears to create a slight positive effect on performance. Players play more
accurately and make fewer mistakes under higher challenges with more complex po-
sitions. The positive effect appears to apply to all the tournament participants.49
Table 2.11 shows the impact of superstar presence for all samples aggregated.
Table 2.12 and Figure 2.21 show the aggregate superstar effect broken down to each
sub-sample for the top quartile players. Moving from Carlsen to Rausis, we observe
increases in the committed mistakes, in the overall complexity, in blunders and mis-
takes, and in the loss rates. At the same time, the win and draw rates decrease,
confirming our theory that an increase in the intensity of a superstar is associated
with stronger adverse responses from the top players. When the gap between the
superstar and the rest of the group is not too wide, all players perform better, but as
the gap widens, performance drops are anticipated.
48In fact, the bottom quartile of players shows better performance with Kasparov
and Karpov’s presence. These players have more wins and fewer losses as a result of
a worse performance by the upper quartile.
49Draw rates are higher in tournaments with Carlsen. Many chess fans criticize
modern chess for excessive amount of draws, which we document in our analysis.
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2.6 Conclusion
The empirical superstar literature finds both positive and negative superstar effect
evidence. For example, in golf, the effort level decreases with the superstar presence.
However, in the 100-meter running or swimming contests, the effort level appears
to increase. In this paper, we show theoretically and empirically that the superstar
effect depends on the intensity of the superstar: if the skill gap between the superstar
and the rest of the field is small, then the superstar effect is positive; otherwise, if
the skill gap is large, the superstar effect is negative.
Using the chess data, we empirically show that the direct superstar (head-to-head)
effect is always negative and the indirect superstar effect depends on the skill gap.
We find a strong choking effect in head-to-head games with a superstar. Players
commit more mistakes than they are expected to when they face a superstar in a
head-to-head game.
The takeaway for firms seeking to hire a superstar employee is that hiring a super-
star employee may create a positive or an adverse effect on the cohort’s performance
depending on the skill level gap. If the gap is too large, there may be negative side
effects of hiring a superstar employee. In these settings, a highly skilled team mem-
ber would destroy competition and create an adverse effect on the rest of the team
members.
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Note: The blue line shows the average ELO rating of top chess players other than
Carlsen (World ranking 2−10). ELO rating data is obtained from Chessbase Mega
Database 2020.
Figure 2.5 Elo ratings of top chess players between 2013-2019.
Note: The blue line shows the average ELO rating of top chess players other than
Kasparov (World ranking 2−10). ELO rating data is obtained from Chessbase
Mega Database 2020.
Figure 2.6 Elo ratings of top chess players between 1995-2001.
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Note: The blue line shows the average ELO rating of top chess players other than
Kasparov or Karpov (World ranking 3−10). ELO rating data is obtained from
Chessbase Mega Database 2020.
Figure 2.7 Elo ratings of top chess players between 1987-1994.
Note: The blue line shows the average ELO rating of top chess players other than
Karpov (World ranking 2−10). ELO rating data is obtained from Chessbase Mega
Database 2020.
Figure 2.8 Elo ratings of top chess players between 1976-1983.
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Note: Judit Polgar is considered the strongest female chess player of all time,
however she stopped competing in female tournaments in 1990 when she was 14
years old. Hou Yifan stopped competing in female tournaments after 2015. The
blue line shows the average ELO rating of top female chess players other than Hou
Yifan or Judit Polgar (World ranking 3−10). ELO rating data is obtained from
FIDE available online at https://ratings.fide.com
Figure 2.9 Elo ratings of top female chess players between 2014-2019.
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Note: Carlsen’s ELO rating data is obtained from FIDE.
Figure 2.10 Carlsen’s tournament performance
Note: Kasparov’s ELO rating data is obtained from Chessbase Mega Database
2020.
Figure 2.11 Kasparov’s tournament performance
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Note: Kasparov’s and Karpov’s ELO rating data is obtained from Chessbase Mega
Database 2020.
Figure 2.12 Kasparov and Karpov’s tournament performance
Note: Karpov’s ELO rating data is obtained from Chessbase Mega Database 2020.
Figure 2.13 Karpov’s tournament performance
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Note: Hou Yifan’s ELO rating data is obtained from Chessbase Mega Database
2020.
Figure 2.14 Hou Yifan’s tournament performance
Note: The tournament is Tres Cantos Open played in June 2012 in Spain. Rausis
had an ELO rating of 2514. His nine opponents had an average ELO rating of 2046.
ELO rating information is obtained from Chessbase Mega Database 2020.
Figure 2.15 Elo rating distribution of a tournament Rausis competed in 2012.
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Note: The game was played between Vincent Keymer (White) and Magnus Carlsen
(Black) on April 20, 2019 during the first round of Grenke Chess Classic 2019.
Keymer’s Average Centipawn Loss (ACPL) was 35.22 and Carlsen’s 26.17 using our
algorithm. A higher ACPL means the player made more mistakes according to the
chess engine. The chess engine used for evaluations is Stockfish 11 with a depth of
19 moves.
Figure 2.16 Computer evaluation of a game played by Carlsen in 2019.
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Note: The game was played between Vincent Keymer (White) and Magnus Carlsen
(Black) on April 20, 2019 during the first round of Grenke Chess Classic 2019.
Keymer’s Average Centipawn Loss (ACPL) was 35.22 and Carlsen’s 26.17 using our
algorithm. Our neural-network board complexity estimate assigns an expected ACPL
score of 34.87. This score is substantially higher than the sample average, 26.56. The
game is within the top 10% of the sample in terms of complexity.
Figure 2.17 Complexity evaluation of a game played by Carlsen in 2019 using an
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Note: This position is from Vincent Keymer (White) vs. Magnus Carlsen (Black),
Grenke Chess Classic 2019 (white to play). Our neural-network algorithm calculates
the probability of making an error as 0.52 (about twice as high as the sample average)
in an amount of 65 centipawns. In the game, white blundered (by playing Bf2) in an
amount of 180 centipawns, according to Stockfish. Before this blunder, the position
was a forced draw.
Figure 2.18 A position from Keymer vs. Carlsen (2019).
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Note: The board complexity measure is obtained via a neural-network algorithm. It
is the "expected ACPL score" according to the AI, depending on the complexity of
a game. The estimated slope is 1.14 for the overall sample of 36,000 games and 2.8
million moves.
Figure 2.19 Scatterplot of board complexity and ACPL scores.
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Note: The board complexity measure is obtained via a neural-network algorithm. It is the "expected ACPL score" according to
the AI which depends on the complexity of a game. The average ACPL score in the sample is 25.49 and the board complexity
score is 26.57 for the overall sample with 36,000 games and 2.8 million moves. The neural-network was trained with an
independent sample consisting of 25,000 games and 2 million moves with games played between players with "National Master"
ranking on average.
Figure 2.20 Distribution of ACPL and board complexity scores.
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics for all samples.
years: 2013-2019 years: 1995-2001
with Carlsen without Carlsen with Kasparov without Kasparov
variable mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
ACPL 16.580 10.755 17.818 11.783 20.554 12.687 21.233 12.947
Difficulty 26.784 5.309 27.040 5.419 27.792 5.576 27.300 5.528
TotalBlunder .179 .508 .229 .576 .238 .562 .288 .686
TotalMistake 1.432 1.797 1.682 1.943 1.772 1.892 1.876 2.006
win .173 .378 .204 .403 .230 .421 .229 .421
draw .654 .476 .592 .491 .545 .498 .541 .498
loss .173 .378 .204 .403 .224 .417 .229 .420
ELO 2759 47.13 2714 80 2684 59.36 2642 65.52
Moves 43.031 15.682 45.198 17.682 38.551 16.280 38.765 15.656
#of tournaments =35 =37 =22 =43
#of games =1,336 =1,774 =1,727 =3,696
#of moves =114,898 =160,362 =133,184 =286,787





with Karpov without Karpov
ACPL 20.762 12.068 21.592 13.235 21.777 13.501 23.099 14.091
Difficulty 27.139 5.555 26.850 5.811 25.461 5.873 26.007 5.787
TotalBlunder .264 .603 .317 .684 .271 .639 .327 .727
TotalMistake 1.821 1.902 1.922 2.028 1.850 2.040 2.061 2.089
win .221 .415 .234 .423 .223 .416 .251 .433
draw .561 .496 .533 .499 .553 .497 .499 .500
loss .218 .413 .234 .423 .224 .417 .250 .433
ELO 2629 60.68 2590 55.97 2558 68.05 2531 76.24
Moves 38.917 16.898 39.635 16.810 36.699 17.542 37.964 17.118
#of tournaments =11 =37 =32 =39
#of games =635 =1,989 =1,967 =3,641
#of moves =50,212 =157,668 =144,633 =278,876
Notes: Superstar player observations are exluded in each sample. Data comes from
Chessbase Mega Database 2020.
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics for all samples. (cont.)
years: 1962-1970 years: 2014-2019
with Fischer without Fischer with Hou Yifan without Hou Yifan
ACPL 24.017 15.634 25.284 15.670 22.466 14.500 21.128 12.301
Difficulty 25.835 5.599 26.077 5.747 27.193 5.225 27.162 5.045
TotalBlunder .342 .768 .349 .746 .405 .736 .380 .755
TotalMistake 2.173 2.128 2.311 2.254 2.341 2.344 2.267 2.209
win .254 .435 .250 .433 .270 .444 .241 .428
draw .492 .500 .500 .500 .459 .499 .519 .500
loss .254 .435 .250 .433 .270 .444 .241 .428
ELO . . . . 2493 72.50 2499 43.43
Moves 38.126 16.458 36.112 15.628 45.823 19.041 46.179 17.511
#of tournaments =15 =82 =4 =6
#of games =1,660 =7,832 =440 =748
#of moves =126,578 =565,611 =40,324 =69,084
years: 2012-2019
with Rausis without Rausis
ACPL 39.425 24.009 35.976 22.443
Difficulty 27.180 5.110 26.470 5.291
TotalBlunder .826 1.167 .751 1.136
TotalMistake 3.806 2.754 3.498 2.704
win .396 .489 .364 .481
draw .209 .407 .273 .445
loss .396 .489 .364 .481
ELO 1979 274.88 2053 259.823
Moves 37.762 14.863 38.242 15.851
#of tournaments =8 =28
#of games =2,106 =6,357
#of moves =159,052 =495,482
Notes: Superstar player observations are exluded in each sample. Data comes from
Chessbase Mega Database 2020.
∗: ELO rating system was first adopted by FIDE beginning 1970.
Table 2.3 Performance against a superstar.
Panel A. Classical
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)




Against Carlsen 1.868*** 0.080*** 0.174** -0.069*** -0.100*** 0.169*** 0.172 3,316 294,876
2013-2019 (0.449) (0.026) (0.085) (0.015) (0.023) (0.025) (0.252)
Against Kasparov 2.300*** 0.093** 0.226** -0.104*** -0.049 0.153*** 1.485*** 5,770 446,322
1995-2001 (0.634) (0.046) (0.095) (0.012) (0.035) (0.037) (0.346)
Against Kasparov/Karpov 2.757*** 0.174*** 0.184* -0.102*** -0.078*** 0.180*** -0.427 2,768 219,607
1987-1994 (0.656) (0.033) (0.093) (0.016) (0.027) (0.030) (0.326)
Against Karpov 3.171*** 0.167*** 0.150* -0.106*** -0.089*** 0.195*** 0.522** 5,326 396,903
1976-1983 (0.579) (0.036) (0.083) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024) (0.253)
Against Fischer 4.379*** 0.150*** 0.222 -0.106*** -0.186*** 0.292*** 2.255*** 9,626 703,525
1962-1970 (0.949) (0.040) (0.149) (0.022) (0.032) (0.040) (0.361)
Against Hou Yifan 4.415** 0.203*** 0.502 -0.111*** -0.203*** 0.314*** 0.839** 1,232 113,436
2014-2019 (1.530) (0.047) (0.437) (0.031) (0.034) (0.029) (0.331)
Against Rausis 9.275*** 0.400*** 0.635** -0.295*** -0.135** 0.430*** 0.457 7,924 603,694
2012-2019 (1.741) (0.092) (0.257) (0.024) (0.055) (0.057) (0.708)
Against Superstar 2.721*** 0.100*** 0.018 -0.115*** -0.059*** 0.174*** 0.627*** 35,962 2,778,363
1962-2019 (0.312) (0.016) (0.055) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.155)
Notes: All regressions include player and year fixed effects, round fixed effects, event site fixed effects, average Elo
rating in the tournament (except for pre-1970 games, as Elo rating was adopted in 1970 by FIDE), player’s Elo
rating (except pre-1970 games), board complexity measured by our neural-network algorithm (except in column 7),
opponent ACPL, player’s side (white or black), and number of moves played. Clustered standard errors (clustered by
tournament) are shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.4 Performance in tournaments with and without Rausis.
Panel A. Classical
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACPL TotalBlunder TotalMistake win draw loss Difficulty
Superstar effect for
All players -1.504 -0.099 0.109 -0.005 0.060* -0.055* 0.289
(1.041) (0.074) (0.097) (0.027) (0.034) (0.028) (0.266)
Top players+ -2.227* -0.065 -0.125 0.034 0.058** -0.093** 0.188
(1.121) (0.066) (0.082) (0.041) (0.026) (0.043) (0.353)
Last 3 Rounds 3.427** 0.217** 0.152 -0.207*** 0.179*** 0.028 1.558
(1.659) (0.087) (0.211) (0.059) (0.050) (0.026) (0.977)
Number of moves 654,534 654,534 654,534 654,534 654,534 654,534 654,534
Number of games 8,463 8,463 8,463 8,463 8,463 8,463 8,463
Notes: Rausis’ games are excluded. The sample consists of open tournaments in Swiss system as opposed
to the following tables in which the samples consist of invitation-based Round robin tournaments. The
third row indicates the last three rounds in the tournament where competition is more intense in a Swiss-
format tournament, as winners in each round get paired with other winners. All regressions include player
and year fixed effects, round fixed effects, event site fixed effects, average Elo rating in the tournament,
player’s Elo rating, board complexity measured by our neural-network algorithm, opponent ACPL, player’s
side (white or black), and number of moves played. Clustered standard errors (clustered by tournament)
are shown in parentheses.
+: These are the players with the top 2 highest Elo rating in a given tournament following Rausis’ Elo
rating.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5 Performance in tournaments with and without Hou Yifan.
Panel A. Classical
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACPL TotalBlunder TotalMistake win draw loss Difficulty
Superstar effect for
Top 25% players 4.344** -0.012 0.807** -0.104* -0.048 0.152** 1.204
(1.846) (0.112) (0.305) (0.054) (0.054) (0.066) (0.753)
Mid 50% players 1.143 0.015 0.076 -0.068 0.085* -0.017 1.172**
(1.039) (0.083) (0.207) (0.042) (0.047) (0.056) (0.447)
Bottom 25% players 1.511 -0.017 0.138 -0.050 -0.032 0.082 0.390
(1.699) (0.104) (0.236) (0.054) (0.044) (0.075) (0.690)
Number of moves 109,408 109,408 109,408 109,408 109,408 109,408 109,408
Number of games 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188
Notes: Hou Yifan’s games are excluded. All regressions include player and year fixed effects, round fixed
effects, event site fixed effects, average Elo rating in the tournament, player’s Elo rating, board complexity
measured by our neural-network algorithm, opponent ACPL, player’s side (white or black), and number of
moves played. Clustered standard errors (clustered by tournament) are shown in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6 Performance in tournaments with and without Fischer.
Panel A. Classical
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACPL TotalBlunder TotalMistake win draw loss Difficulty
Superstar effect for
All players 0.234 0.016 0.002 -0.025 -0.003 0.028* -0.536***
(0.393) (0.019) (0.061) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.156)
Top players 0.910 0.024 0.277*** -0.070** 0.060** 0.010 -0.858**
(0.664) (0.030) (0.101) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.331)
Number of moves 692,072 692,072 692,072 692,072 692,072 692,072 692,072
Number of games 9,491 9,491 9,491 9,491 9,491 9,491 9,491
Notes: Fischer’s games are excluded. Top 10 players are the top chess players in the world from 1962-1970
other than Fischer.+ All regressions include player and year fixed effects, round fixed effects, event site
fixed effects, board complexity measured by our neural-network algorithm, opponent ACPL, player’s side
(white or black), and number of moves played. Clustered standard errors (clustered by tournament) are
shown in parentheses.
+: These players are Tigran Petrosian, Viktor Korchnoi, Boris Spassky, Vasily Smyslov, Mikhail Tal,
Mikhail Botvinnik, Paul Keres, Efim Geller, David Bronstein, and Samuel Reshevsky.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7 Performance in tournaments with and without Kasparov & Karpov.
Panel A. Classical
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACPL TotalBlunder TotalMistake win draw loss Difficulty
Superstar effect when both present
Top 25% players -0.174 -0.057 -0.034 0.014 -0.072* 0.058 0.692
(1.048) (0.052) (0.185) (0.031) (0.038) (0.041) (0.452)
Mid 50% players 0.088 -0.006 -0.093 0.021 -0.028 0.007 0.285
(0.568) (0.050) (0.084) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.347)
Bottom 25% players -2.137** -0.099* -0.174 0.063** -0.006 -0.057* 0.316
(0.935) (0.049) (0.146) (0.025) (0.036) (0.031) (0.418)
Number of moves 207,880 207,880 207,880 207,880 207,880 207,880 207,880
Number of games 2,624 2,624 2,624 2,624 2,624 2,624 2,624
Notes: Kasparov and Karpov’s games are excluded. Top 25% is defined as having an Elo rating in the
top 25% among the competitors at the time of the tournament. Bottom 25% is defined as having an Elo
in the bottom quartile. All regressions include player and year fixed effects, round fixed effects, event site
fixed effects, average Elo rating in the tournament, player’s Elo rating, board complexity measured by our
neural-network algorithm, opponent ACPL, player’s side (white or black), and number of moves played.
Clustered standard errors (clustered by tournament) are shown in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8 Performance in tournaments with and without Kasparov.
Panel A. Classical
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACPL TotalBlunder TotalMistake win draw loss Difficulty
Superstar effect for
Top 25% players -1.253* -0.061* -0.111 0.025 0.045 -0.069*** 0.496
(0.696) (0.034) (0.103) (0.025) (0.030) (0.023) (0.407)
Mid 50% players -0.229 -0.002 -0.054 0.028* 0.003 -0.031 -0.191
(0.538) (0.027) (0.072) (0.017) (0.023) (0.020) (0.387)
Bottom 25% players 0.559 -0.005 0.049 -0.027 0.012 0.014 -0.097
(0.688) (0.041) (0.096) (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.490)
Number of moves 420,348 420,348 420,348 420,348 420,348 420,348 420,348
Number of games 5,427 5,427 5,427 5,427 5,427 5,427 5,427
Notes: Kasparov’s games are excluded. Top 25% is defined as having an Elo rating in the top 25%
among the competitors at the time of the tournament. Bottom 25% is defined as having an Elo in the
bottom quartile. All regressions include player and year fixed effects, round fixed effects, event site fixed
effects, average Elo rating in the tournament, player’s Elo rating, board complexity measured by our
neural-network algorithm, opponent ACPL, player’s side (white or black), and number of moves played.
Clustered standard errors (clustered by player-year) are shown in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9 Performance in tournaments with and without Karpov.
Panel A. Classical
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACPL TotalBlunder TotalMistake win draw loss Difficulty
Superstar effect for
Top 25% players -1.843 -0.205** -0.148 -0.050 0.137* -0.088 2.316**
(2.357) (0.098) (0.399) (0.055) (0.071) (0.100) (0.895)
Mid 50% players -0.915 -0.249*** 0.091 -0.033 0.047 -0.014 1.445
(2.103) (0.095) (0.289) (0.047) (0.064) (0.084) (1.042)
Bottom 25% players 2.375 -0.225* 0.820** -0.245*** -0.066 0.311 1.445
(2.304) (0.135) (0.397) (0.076) (0.190) (0.245) (1.023)
Number of moves 381,460 381,460 381,460 381,460 381,460 381,460 381,460
Number of games 5,120 5,120 5,120 5,120 5,120 5,120 5,120
Notes: Karpov’s games are excluded. Top 25% is defined as having an Elo rating in the top 25%
among the competitors at the time of the tournament. Bottom 25% is defined as having an Elo in the
bottom quartile. All regressions include player and year fixed effects, round fixed effects, event site fixed
effects, average Elo rating in the tournament, player’s Elo rating, board complexity measured by our
neural-network algorithm, opponent ACPL, player’s side (white or black), and number of moves played.
Clustered standard errors (clustered by player-year) are shown in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.10 Performance in tournaments with and without Carlsen.
Panel A. Classical
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACPL TotalBlunder TotalMistake win draw loss Difficulty
Superstar effect for
Top 25% players -0.080 0.040 -0.128 0.010 0.022 -0.032 0.756**
(0.698) (0.032) (0.097) (0.031) (0.038) (0.032) (0.362)
Mid 50% players -1.221* 0.008 -0.186* -0.002 0.072** -0.069** 0.241
(0.680) (0.033) (0.097) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.314)
Bottom 25% players -0.680 -0.004 -0.073 -0.013 0.059 -0.046 0.770*
(0.993) (0.044) (0.128) (0.035) (0.041) (0.039) (0.423)
Number of moves 275,260 275,260 275,260 275,260 275,260 275,260 275,260
Number of games 3,110 3,110 3,110 3,110 3,110 3,110 3,110
Notes: Carlsen’s games are excluded. Top 25% is defined as having an Elo rating in the top 25%
among the competitors at the time of the tournament. Bottom 25% is defined as having an Elo in the
bottom quartile. All regressions include player and year fixed effects, round fixed effects, event site fixed
effects, average Elo rating in the tournament, player’s Elo rating, board complexity measured by our
neural-network algorithm, opponent ACPL, player’s side (white or black), and number of moves played.
Clustered standard errors (clustered by player-year) are shown in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.11 Performance in tournaments with and without a Superstar (overall effect).
Panel A. Classical
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ACPL TotalBlunder TotalMistake win draw loss Difficulty
Superstar effect for
Top 25% players -0.439 -0.037* 0.072 0.000 0.009 -0.009 0.060
(0.358) (0.022) (0.058) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.186)
Mid 50% players -0.592** -0.013 -0.050 0.004 0.009 -0.012 -0.071
(0.260) (0.018) (0.033) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.156)
Bottom 25% players 0.049 -0.045** 0.090* 0.012 -0.005 -0.007 -0.164
(0.382) (0.021) (0.047) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.192)
Number of moves 1,858,099 1,858,099 1,858,099 1,858,099 1,858,099 1,858,099 1,858,099
Number of games 24,083 24,083 24,083 24,083 24,083 24,083 24,083
Notes: Superstars’ games are excluded. Top 25% is defined as having an Elo rating in the top 25%
among the competitors at the time of the tournament. Bottom 25% is defined as having an Elo in the
bottom quartile. All regressions include player and year fixed effects, round fixed effects, event site fixed
effects, average Elo rating in the tournament, player’s Elo rating, board complexity measured by our
neural-network algorithm, opponent ACPL, player’s side (white or black), and number of moves played.
Clustered standard errors (clustered by tournament) are shown in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.12 Performance in tournaments with and without a superstar for top players.
Panel A. Classical
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)




Carlsen present -0.080 0.040 -0.128 0.010 0.022 -0.032 0.756** 3,110 275,260
2013-2019 (0.698) (0.032) (0.097) (0.031) (0.038) (0.032) (0.362)
Kasparov present -1.427** -0.086** -0.142 0.025 0.028 -0.053** 0.694 5,427 420,348
1995-2001 (0.696) (0.035) (0.102) (0.025) (0.033) (0.025) (0.466)
Kasparov&Karpov present -0.848 -0.062 -0.124 0.031 -0.082** 0.051 0.377 2,624 207,880
1987-1994 (1.030) (0.059) (0.168) (0.033) (0.036) (0.039) (0.436)
Karpov present -1.843 -0.205** -0.148 -0.050 0.137* -0.088 2.316** 5,120 381,460
1976-1983 (2.357) (0.098) (0.399) (0.055) (0.071) (0.100) (0.895)
Fischer present+ 0.431 0.007 0.138 -0.040 0.042* -0.002 -0.768*** 9,491 692,072
1962-1970 (0.655) (0.031) (0.103) (0.031) (0.025) (0.028) (0.267)
Hou Yifan present 4.557** -0.041 0.970*** -0.118** -0.055 0.172** 0.734 1,188 109,408
2014-2019 (1.999) (0.112) (0.341) (0.058) (0.057) (0.071) (0.752)
Rausis present++ 3.427** 0.217** 0.152 -0.207*** 0.179*** 0.028 1.558 8,463 654,534
2012-2019 (1.659) (0.087) (0.211) (0.059) (0.050) (0.026) (0.977)
Aggregate effect+++ -0.439 -0.037* 0.072 0.000 0.009 -0.009 0.060 24,215 1,923,282
1962-2019 (0.358) (0.022) (0.058) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.186)
Notes: Superstars’ games are excluded. A top player is defined as having an Elo rating in the top 25% among the competitors
at the time of the tournament. All regressions include player and year fixed effects, round fixed effects, event site fixed effects,
average Elo rating in the tournament (except for pre-1970 games, as Elo rating was adopted in 1970 by FIDE), player’s Elo
rating (except pre-1970 games), board complexity measured by our neural-network algorithm, opponent ACPL, player’s side,
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Notes (cont.): and number of moves played. Clustered standard errors (clustered by tournament) are shown in parentheses.
+: Since no Elo rating information was available in Fischer’s era, we define the top players as the top chess players in the
world from 1962-1970 other than Fischer. These players are Tigran Petrosian, Viktor Korchnoi, Boris Spassky, Vasily Smyslov,
Mikhail Tal, Mikhail Botvinnik, Paul Keres, Efim Geller, David Bronstein, and Samuel Reshevsky. Kasparov (2003) provides
a detailed overview on each of these players.
++: The estimates are for the top 5% players with the highest Elo ratings in a given tournament following Rausis’ Elo rating
during the second half of the tournament. In a Swiss type open tournament, only the very top players have a chance to win the
tournament, and the competition gets more intense as winners in each round are paired with other winners.
+++: The sample is restricted to tournaments with average Elo rating information available.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 2.21 Superstar presence effect for top players over superstar intensity
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Chapter 3
Peer Effects and Motivation in High Level
Performers1
3.1 Introduction
"It is not the size of the dog in
the fight, it is the size of the
fight in the dog."
−Mark Twain.
It is well documented that motivation affects outcomes. (Prendergast 2007; Prender-
gast 2008; Bradler et al. 2016) From the perspective of a manager, acknowledging
the performance of a promising team member could give a substantial boost on their
effort. (Orpen 1997; Fu and Deshpande 2014) Similarly, lack of full confidence in a
team member could create strong demotivating effects. (Brown et al. 2015; Ellwardt,
Wittek, and Wielers 2012; Addison and Teixeira 2020)
Moreover, evidence on peer-effects among team members is documented in studies
using settings ranging from analyzing golf players to grocery store employees (Mas
and Moretti 2009; Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo 2009; Gould and Kaplan 2011;
Villeval 2020). Firms can potentially benefit from homogeneous teams in which the
higher skilled and more experienced employees provide support to newly introduced
team members, resulting in positive productivity spillovers.
In this paper we investigate whether a “signal of confidence”−directly and through
peer-effects of other similarly signaled fighters− can change the course of outcomes.
We gather information on corner assignments from more than 4,000 fights that took
1Eren Bilen with Robert Pettis.
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place as part of Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), a mixed martial arts pro-
motion, between 1993 and 2020. To control for fighter ability, we create a database of
fighter ratings similar to the Elo rating system used in chess. Gathering information
on detailed fight statistics, bets, and purses, we find that “underdog” fighters are
likely to win their matches more often if they are assigned to the red corner in fights
when they should have been assigned to the blue corner. This works against the
expectations of fighter ratings and bets markets for these particular cases.2 We ver-
ify that the the red corner advantage persists in fights between fighters with similar
ability. We rule out an evolutionary color effect explanation by collecting information
on fighters’ trunk colors.
The effect of color on performance has been investigated in various settings. Hill
and Barton (2005) report that in the 2004 Olympic Games, contestants who wore red
in four combat sports (boxing, tae-kwon do, Greco-Roman wrestling and freestyle
wrestling) had more wins compared to contestants wearing blue. Hill and Barton
(2005) attribute this result to the influence of color red on human mood and aggres-
sion. Using an experiment, Dreiskaemper et al. (2013) show fighters in the red corner
have higher heart rates and that body functions of the contestants are influenced by
wearing red. The red color effect seems to exist for rugby players (Piatti, Savage, and
Torgler 2012), goalkeepers in soccer (Greenlees, Eynon, and Thelwell 2013) and even
in computer game competitions. (Ilie et al. 2008)
Against the findings of Hill and Barton (2005), Hagemann, Strauss, and Leißing
(2008) show evidence that Hill and Barton (2005)’s findings with Olympic contestants
could be explained by a "referee bias" rather than an effect of color on the contestants.
Hagemann, Strauss, and Leißing (2008) run an experiment with professional tae-kwon
do referees, and ask them to score video recorded fights. Colors for the contestants
2In this study, we are unable to discount the possibility of fights being fixed and
promotions having non-public information about their fighters that could affect the
outcome with which they use to pick the fighters’ corner.
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in these fights were randomly changed with post-video editing. They show evidence
that referees systematically favored the fighter wearing red.
A set of papers test the validity of Hill and Barton (2005)’s findings. Rowe, Harris,
and Roberts (2005) find that Hill and Barton (2005)’s results do not hold for Judo
competitions in the same 2004 Olympic Games.3 Seife (2012) extends the previous
analysis to 2008 Olympics and show no evidence of differences in outcomes and fighter
colors. More work exists showing the color itself has little to no impact on perfor-
mance, but rather the confounding factors are the main drivers of the association
between higher win rates and the color (Allen and Jones 2014). In a closer setting
to our work, Pollet and Peperkoorn (2013) check for a “color effect” in UFC fights.
They obtain trunk color information for 210 fights and find that wearing red trunks
does not have any significant impact on fight outcomes.
We explicitly test if a pure color-effect exists using our sample of UFC fights.
Collecting information on trunk colors for 600 fights, we indeed document a pure
color-effect, albeit with a modest impact. Our results show that the player who sees
the red color on their opponent scores more wins. Similarly, a player who wears red
trunks loses more often compared to his games wearing any other color. This small
color-effect works in the opposite direction of the red corner effect.
The remainder of our paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 provides a background
on UFC. Section 3 gives information on the data collected and constructed. Section 4
outlines the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 includes
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
3Dijkstra and Preenen (2008) show that corner assignment in Olympic judo com-
petitions is non-random thus need to be accounted for. In such competitions, however,
there is no variation in the corner color and color worn by the fighters hence they con-
duct their analyses via restricting their sample to different stages of the tournament
in an attempt to account for the ability gap.
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3.2 Background
UFC is a mixed martial arts (MMA) promotion founded in 1993. Unlike other popular
combat sports, it allows fighters to utilize numerous styles and techniques. It is the
largest MMA promotion in the world in terms of fan base, revenue, and value.4 This
strength allows them to recruit the most highly rated talent in the business.5
3.2.1 Corners
In fighting sports, including UFC, fighters begin their bouts fighting out of a particular
corner, with the corner denoted by color, either red or blue. Originally, many fighting
sports, such as boxing fought outdoors.6 The corner a fighter fought out of was
therefore of great importance; if a fighter is facing the sun, they may have more
difficulty seeing their opponent coming. Due to this disadvantage, corners were chosen
at the time of the fight by a coin flip. (Hauser 2019) During the 1980s, however,
television networks wanted the favored fighters to sit in certain corners for visibility.
Now, favored fighters are placed in the red corner, and the underdogs fight out of the
blue corner.
Match-ups and the corner placement are decided by two UFC matchmakers Joe
Silva and Mick Maynard.7 As a private promotion, UFC is free to set up any fight
between two fighters as long as fighters agree on the terms. Typically matchmakers
consider the potential popularity of a given fight which maximizes fan entertainment.
The favorite fighter is then assigned to the red corner and the underdog to the the
blue corner. The definition of favorite is vague in the sense that there is no specific
4Fan base size being measured by social media “likes.”
5According to www.cbssports.com, nine out of ten of the best MMA fighters of all
time fought for UFC at some point.
6The authors conducted an interview with sports writer Thomas Hauser to get
background information on corner assignment in fighting sports.
7Sean Shelby, who worked as a matchmaker at UFC with Joe Silva retired and
was replaced by Mick Maynard in 2016.
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metric (such as Elo ratings in chess) to determine the favorite fighter. Hence it can be
expected to have inefficiencies in the corner assignments due to not having a standard
universal ranking system.8
Corner assignment matters for several reasons. First, it signals which fighter is
more likely to win according to the promoters, and thus can influence the mental
state of the fighters. Second, when a fighter is assigned to a corner, they are grouped
with fighters of their own corner color for scheduled logistics, such as sharing the
same locker room or busing to the event.9 Training and preparing with better fight-
ers can improve the outcome of a game through peer-effects and knowledge spillovers.
Finally, there could be other advantages to fighting out of the red corner. For ex-
ample, the red corner gets assigned the most experienced “cutmen” to dress wounds
in between rounds. In Section 3.6.3, we investigate the degree to which cutmen can
affect outcomes.
3.3 Data
We obtain every official UFC match published that took place between November
1993 and March 2020 from www.ufcstats.com. These data includes detailed fight-
level and player-level information such as the corners, number of hits attempted, num-
ber of hits landed, and outcome of the fight. We link these data to bets data scraped
from www.bestfightodds.com. These data include opening and closing spreads, i.e.
the spread when the fight pairings are announced by UFC and the very last spread
available on the day of the fight night. Lastly, we link the fight purse data scraped
from www.thesportsdaily.com.
8UFC has an official ranking for only the top 15 fighters. These rankings are
determined via a voting panel made up of media members.
9Hauser 2019 notes that blue locker rooms are often “dreary places”.
86
3.3.1 Fight Statistics
For each fight, UFC publishes detailed fight-level performance statistics such as the
total number of strikes attempted and landed, the portion of strikes landed on op-
ponent’s head, body, or leg. Player-level characteristics include height, weight, and
reach of a player, age, dominant fighting technique at the time of the fight. Further
fight-level characteristics include the name and location of the event, number of at-
tendees at the event, bout type, names of the referees and judges. In terms of the
outcomes, the result of the fight is included specifically listing when (measured in
seconds between the start and end of the fight) and how a fight has ended: e.g., a
technical knockout, decided by judges, or “guillotine choke from guard.”
3.3.2 Elo Ratings
Many sports have an official rating system where each player (or a team) is ranked
according to the wins and losses they had accumulated up to a contest. One of the
most popular of such systems is the Elo ratings used in chess. With such rating
system, it is possible to assign a probability on the outcome of a contest using the
pool of past performances up to the contest.
Suppose two fighters, fighter i who fights out of the red corner and fighter j who
fights out of the blue corner compete in a fight. The outcome of a fight is a win,
draw, or a loss. Assuming each fighter’s performance on a given night, pi, pj a
random draw from a normal distribution centered around the true level of perfor-
mance, the probability that fighter i wins over fighter j is a function of Elo rat-
ings of both fighters, P (pi > pj) = P (pi − pj > 0). With pi and pj independent,





















where pi ∼ N(µi, σ2), z a standard
normal random variable, and Φ(.) the c.d.f. of the normal distribution. For conve-
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nience, assume that the common variance is σ2 = (20007 )
2, such that the expected
outcome of a fight becomes:






where Si is the actual outcome for fighter i. That is, if fighter i wins then Si = 1
(similarly, Si = 0 if he or she loses). Ri and Rj are the Elo ratings (at the time of the
fight) for fighters i and j, respectively. Once an outcome is realized, fighter i’s rating
is updated with the rule10
Ratingi,t+1 = Ratingi,t +K [Si − Et (Si | Ri, Rj)] (3.2)
where K is a constant for rate of adjustment.11 Following this strategy, we create a
database of fighter ratings that assigns fighters an initial rating on their debut fight,
and update them according to (3) with each fight. In Figure 3.1, we plot the average
Elo rating over weightclass by official UFC rank as of May, 2020. While only the top
15 fighters in a class are officially ranked, our ranking seems to perform well, as the
higher ranked fighters have higher Elo rankings. This correlation persists throughout
each weight class.
3.3.3 Bets
UFC’s popularity as a combat sport has generated a large betting community. Sim-
ilar to other sports, it is possible to bet on the outcome of a match using online
betting platforms. Opening betting odds are published by each oddsmaker after the
announcement of the matchups by UFC. Bets are closed on the fight night. We obtain
10Similarly, fighter j’s rating is updated via Ratingj,t+1 = Ratingj,t +
K [Sj − Et (Sj | Ri, Rj)]
11We assume K = 30. Our results are robust to alternative adjustment rates.
(results available upon request)
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opening and closing betting odds from www.bestfightodds.com available for more
than 3,500 fights. Using expectations from the bets market, we can determine which
fighter before the fight night is the favorite fighter, thus should receive the red corner
per the bets market.
3.3.4 Random Forest
We assume that the betting market for UFC is thick based on its popularity; how-
ever, for completeness, we also include measures of the corner decision process using
a machine learning algorithm with features based on all available information in a
fighter’s history.12 To accomplish this, we use a random forest: we generate a boot-
strapped dataset where numerous decision trees are grown using a random selection
of features at each node. Each tree “votes” on if the fighter is expected to win or lose.
These trees are first created using a sample of the overall dataset and tested against
the rest to produce the desired output. In our case, we want the model to not take
into account future knowledge, thus we limited the training set to fights that occur
prior to an individual fight. The following fight would include the previous training
set plus the prior fight. As many observations are needed in the training set for this
approach, we set the first testing sample to be the first fight of 2010, 17 years after
the first UFC fight. In our analysis, we utilize both the overall expectation on if the
random forest expects a fighter to win, as well as the percent of votes differential
between the fighters.
12A sample of features used for random forest: Fighter, opponent, date, location,
if the fight was a title bout, what weight class the fight is, number of rounds, win-
ning streak, losing streak, draws, average attempts for clinch hits [where fighters are
grappled in a standing position], average clinch hits, average body attempts, average
body hits, average distance attempts, average distance hits, average attempts on the
ground, average hits on the ground, average strikes judged to be “significant” landed,
opponent wins by doctor stoppage, experience measures such as total time fought
and total rounds, and many more.
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3.3.5 Purses
The total pay for UFC fighters, or purses, come from multiple factors. Fighters
are paid per fight and the amount depends on how good of a draw the fighter is,
sponsorships, event size, and performance. The performance incentives include a
win bonus, performance of the night bonus, fight of the night bonus, and formerly,
knockout of the night and submission of the night bonuses. These bonuses are often
in the tens of thousands of dollars. For example, the performance of the night bonus
is $50,000. These performance incentives do not change much over time and do not
change based on the popularity of a fighter, thus the bonuses may be many times the
payout to show for less established fighters, some of whom make as low as $3,000.
They may be a drop in the bucket for fighters such as Conor McGregor whom has
earned $3,000,000 just for showing up. Data on purses is limited as most states have,
at some point, moved to consider purse data as confidential.
3.3.6 Performance Enhancing Drugs (PED) Cases
The use of performance-enchancing drugs (PED) has been an issue in many sports,
including UFC. There have been numerous cases in which a fighter is tested positive
for banned substances. Among the reasons We obtain a list of UFC fighters who were
caught with a PED since 2015 from the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA).
Fighters using PEDs can potentially performed better than their expected per-
formance. Their decision to use PEDs could be impacted by pressure to perform.
(Creado and Reardon 2016) Pressure could come from, perhaps, a better assignment
than they statistically deserve. This could be a contributor to the size of the effect
of assignment to a better corner on wins. While in a sense this could represent a
mental effect of corner assignment on wins, we believe it best to try and disentangle
this effect. We therefore run models including and not including fighters we have
identified as having used PEDs.
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Betting odds are published as a time-series for each fight with the first observation
being the opening betting odds and the last observation closing odds. Figure 3.2 shows
a histogram for the difference in fighters’ opening and closing betting odds. The green
histogram shows that on average, betting odds do not change significantly over time
for given a pair of fighters. However, blue bars show when a fighter who was convicted
at least once in their career due to their use of PEDs have odds favoring them towards
the fight night. In other words, there are instances in which a PED fighter was
announced the underdog in the opening betting odds and with bet market’s demand
adjustments, they become the favorite before the fight night.
3.4 Empirical Design
We start from the following baseline specification which checks the differences in win
rates between the red corner and the blue corner for all fights,
Wini,j,k = β0 + β1 Redi,j,k + ΨXi,j,k + ηi + νj + τk + εi,j,k (3.3)
where Wini,j,k is an indicator equals 1 if fighter i wins against fighter j in fight k.
Redi,j,k equals one if Player i fights in the red corner against fighter j in fight k. Xi,j,k
includes controls such as “opponent quality”, event location, event attendance, ηi is
player fixed-effects, εi is the idiosyncratic shock.
A result showing β1 > 0, can be potentially due to two reasons (i) Being in the
red corner gives you an advantage over your opponent, (ii) Players who are assigned
to the red corner are “higher ability” fighters in the first place. Thus estimating
Equation 3.3 would give biased estimates due to higher ability fighters selecting into
the red corner.
One way to control for the ability effect is to create a process that assigns players
to their “deserved” corners on the basis of “player quality at the time of the fight”
and find the “undeserved” assignments.
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Assignment Rule 1. If Ability of Fighter X > Ability of Fighter Y (at the time of
the fight) then Fighter X gets assigned to the red corner.
If this condition is not satisfied, then the corner assignment is undeserved such that
the underdog fighter is assigned to the red corner (against tradition). If the weaker
fighter still secures more wins being on red corner, this would provide evidence on
the “color effect,” independent of ability.
One approach to measure player quality is to use “net wins” i.e., wins− losses for
each player at the time of the fight. However this approach has two problems (i) It is
possible to have fighters with similar net wins, but against different skilled opponents
in their record (ii) It is difficult to distinguish two fighters with similar net wins and
different levels of wins and losses.
Arguably, a better approach is to use a ranking system similar to Elo rankings in
chess. Each player gets a starting Elo rating at the beginning of their career. As they
progress in their career, their rating changes are calculated via Equation 3.2 with
each fight.
Assignment Rule 1.1. If Elo rating of Fighter X > Elo rating of Y (at the time of
the fight) then Fighter X gets assigned to the red corner.
In addition to fighters’ Elo ratings at the time of the fight, we use information from
the bets markets to further determine which of the fighters has a higher expected
win:
Assignment Rule 1.2. If Elo rating of Fighter X > Elo rating of Y and Fighter X
is the bets favorite (at the time of the fight) then Fighter X gets assigned to the red
corner.
Using these assignment criteria, we identify “off cases” in which an underdog fighter
is assigned to the red corner. In these fights, according to expectations from both
Elo ratings, and bets market expectations, the underdog fighter has less chances
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for victory. We can test if the opposite is observed in the data via the following
specification:
Wini,j,k = β0 + β1 BetterAssignmenti,j,k + ΨXi,j,k + ηi + νj + τk + εi,j,k (3.4)
whereWini,j,k = 1 if fighter i wins against fighter j in fight k. BetterAssignmenti,j,k =
1 if the underdog fighter is assigned in the red corner instead of the blue corner.
As an alternative specification, we check if color assignments matter in fights with
similar-ability fighters via a setup that takes into account the distances in ability
between each fighter. For this, we estimate Equation 3.3 and restrict the ability
differences to smaller bandwidths of elo rating difference, bet expectation difference,
and expectation difference of random forest votes. For such fights between close
ability fighters, we expect no significant differences in win rates to any of the corners,
unless there is a significant edge a fighter can enjoy with being on the the red corner.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the full sample, and the sample re-
stricted to the red corner and the blue corner fighters. According to our Elo rating
calculations, the red corner fighters have higher Elo rating on average than the the
blue corner fighters. Similarly, the red corner fighters are more often the bet favorites,
and our machine learning methods estimate the red corner fighters to be more likely
to be the winners. The last three rows show the proportion of “off cases” where an
underdog fighter is assigned in the red corner using each of our assignment methods.
Table 3.2 presents the confusion matrices for each assignment method. Each matrix
contains the count of underdog and favorite fighters who should receive the the red
corner obtained via each assignment method, and their proportion of actually receiv-
ing the the red corner. 64% of the the red corner fighters had the higher ELO rating;
70% were the bet favorites; and received 92% of the random forest votes predicting
the stronger fighter. Each proportion being larger than 50% does indeed imply the
stronger fighters get the the red corner. Moreover, it shows there are “off cases:” 36%
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of the red corner fighters were ELO underdogs; 30% bet underdogs and 8% random
forest underdogs. We will focus on these particular cases in the next section.
3.5 Results
We start by verifying that fighters on the the red corner indeed secure more wins.
Table 3.3 shows the simple correlation between fighting out of the red corner on win
rates. A fighter in the the red corner has a 32 percentage points higher probability of
victory compared to a fighter in the blue corner, controlling for fighter’s Elo ratings
and fight performance statistics. As discussed in the previous section, this estimate
cannot be interpreted as causal, due to higher ability fighters selecting into the red
corner. We then check if differences in ability is the only driver of this estimate, or if
receiving the red corner itself changes the outcome of a match.
In Tables 3.4-3.6, we report the baseline specification of fights fought between
fighters with similar prefight expected win probabilities per their ELO ratings, bet
expectations, and expectations obtained via our machine learning algorithm. In fights
with similarly rated players in terms of ELO ratings, the red corner fighters still man-
age to score more wins. They secure 30− 36 percentage points more wins in the red
corner against similarly ranked opponents compared to their games against similarly
ranked opponents fought out of the blue corner. Results from bet expectations and
machine learning algorithms also document the edge for the the red corner fighters.
The magnitude of the win rate difference with these methods is documented at a
range of 5− 22 percentage points.13
Tables 3.7-3.8 show the performance of underdogs, according to Elo rankings and
the betting market, who fought out of the red corner.14 They appear to secure more
13Restricting the sample to fighters with at least three fights at the time of the
fight gives similar results. (results available upon request)
14Our results do not hold when we also include the random forest assignments.
These rankings were the most accurate, and as such, reduced the variance of better
assignment significantly.
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wins according to all our assignment criteria with a magnitude ranging from 5 to
18 percentage points. These fighters were expected to lose to their opponents before
the fight; however, they seem to perform above expectations, indicating that corner
assignment influences the outcome of a fight. Column (5) checks how underdogs
performed at their “debut”. If they were given red corner, they seem to perform
extraordinarily, documented by stronger magnitudes of the coefficient. Column (6)
presents the coefficient estimated with the experienced fighters, who had at least 3
fights in their career at the time of the fight. They also appear to benefit from being
in the red corner.
Lastly, we observe that fighters who were convicted of using PEDs benefit more
from being assigned to the red corner as an underdog. Column (7) documents the
effect of being in the red corner against a stronger opponent for fighters with PED
experience at any point in their career. The effect is about two times stronger with
Elo rating assignment alone; five times stronger when bets are introduced; and 20%
stronger when random forest votes are taken into account. One driver for these results
could be that PED usage may act as a catalyst for the red corner effect. Motivational
effects could potentially be realized more strongly with the help of PEDs.
3.6 Robustness Checks
3.6.1 Fighter Clothing
To test the hypothesis of “color-effect” proposed in earlier studies, we collect infor-
mation on fighters’ trunks colors for 1200 fighters in 600 fights.15 With individual
searches for images from the each fight, we identify the fighters and record the color of
their trunks worn. We observe 156 fighters with blue trunks and 131 fighters wearing
red trunks. The remaining fighters wore black, gold, green, grey, white, and yellow.
Counts on each color are presented in Table 3.9. Note that fighters are more likely
15Each fighter, generally, will have their gloves and tape in the color of their corner.
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to wear a different color than their corner assignment and may even wear the colors
of the opposite corner on occasion. We check if a behavioral response exists due to
the red color raising aggressiveness from either side in Tables 3.10-3.11. It appears in
all specifications, wearing red trunks is associated with lower chances to win. Alter-
nately, seeing red trunks on the opponent is associated with increased chances of win,
albeit with imprecise coefficients. On average, wearing red trunks decreases chances
to win by about 10 percentage points while fighting against an opponent wearing red
increases chances of win by approximately 0.7 − 3.7 percentage points. This effect
works in the opposite direction of the red corner effect.16 While the magnitudes of
these coefficients are not as strong to offset the gains from fighting out of the red
corner, we believe our results on trunks colors do indeed fit within the hypothesis of
behavioral responses due to perception of color.
3.6.2 Assessing Heterogeneity in Purse Values
Incentives and prizes are well documented to have an effect on performance in con-
tests. (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Bognanno, Michael L.
1990; Coffey and Maloney 2010). We test the heterogeneity of the red corner effect
for fights with higher stakes. Tables 3.12-3.13 present the the red corner difference
in win rate split with low and high purse fight samples. We observe the red corner
effect is stronger for most bandwidths tightening around even ELO ratings for low
purse fights. We offer the following explanations that we are unable to disentangle:
prize incentive could be different for blue and red corner fighters; fights that are ex-
pected to be close could receive higher purses for their entertainment value; and high
purse fights are more likely to have experienced fighters, thus lessening information
asymmetry.
16A fighter who fights out of the blue corner sees his opponent’s red gloves, and
vice versa. However, Tables 3.4-3.6 showed fighting off the blue corner leads to
disproportionately worse fight outcomes, despite any potential performance boost
from seeing red on their opponent.
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3.6.3 Cutmen: A Possible Other Advantage To Red-Corner Assignment
A “cutman” is a person trained in first aid, though not a doctor, that treats wounds
between rounds and prepares handwraps if requested, prior to the fight. Treating
these wounds are integral to avoid defeat as if they are not quickly and properly
treated, it could impair a fighter’s ability to see. If this occurs, a referee will stop the
fight and the opponent will be awarded the victory.
Anecdotally, we believe there may be reasons to expect the red corner fighters
−being the house favorite− to receive more skilled cutmen. For instance, in an
interview, famous cutman Jacob “Stitch” Duran Gelber (2013) states that while he
tries to keep his “neutrality” in terms of which corner he is assigned to, he typically
ends up in the the red corner. Of course, the assignment of cutmen could be a problem
only if the skill level difference between the experienced cutman in the the red corner
is sufficiently different from that of the the blue corner cutmen systematically, so that
it could affect the outcome of the match.17
If this is the case, then a fighter assigned to the the red corner with the experi-
enced cutman has both a psychological advantage and the advantage of better care in
between rounds, with the latter possibly directly affecting the result of the match and
thus bias our results upward. We investigate the extent to which this is a problem
in this section. In Table 3.14, we show the frequency of the red corner assignment
17“Stitch” goes on to mention an anecdote that support the idea of some cutmen
being better than others: “I have tons of stories from guys and we’re talking about
the importance of a cutman. When B.J. Penn fought Joe Stevenson, I think we were
in England, I was working B.J. Penns corner and Joe Stevenson ended up with a big
old gash between his eyes. He’s bleeding like a pig and we stopped the fight. And in
the dressing room, his trainer is telling me now after the fight in the dressing room
Joe was saying, ‘Where was Stitch? Where’s Stitch?’ And those guys kind of look
up to what we do. I think, especially of all the cutmen, they have a lot of confidence
in me and that was just a nice little gesture. It was nice that he made that kind of
comment.”
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and winning strictly due to a cut.18 It is clear that the the red corner fighter over-
whelmingly wins their fights; the number of fights won via decision due to cuts is
very small.
Tables 3.15-3.16 test whether cutmen could be the main driver of the the red
corner advantage. It appears cutmen have a small positive impact on the outcome.
Absence of cutmen effect, we expect no differential increase in the fight outcomes
won via cutmen. The coefficent of 0.006 indicates the red corner fighters have 0.06
percentage point more wins ended due to a cut. A cutman’s impact is most likely
too small to explain the the red corner edge.
3.7 Conclusion
Motivation in the workplace is a significant concern for firms. By signaling confidence
in their workers and thereby fostering a positive workplace atmosphere, can firms
observe performance benefits? Using observations from UFC fights, we find that it
is possible to improve success through signaling confidence. Fighters compete out of
two corners: red and blue; with the red corner designated for the stronger player.
To control for player strength, we use three methods: (i) We construct a database of
Elo ratings similar to the official Elo ratings used in many other competitive sports
such as chess. (ii) We obtain betting odds information for each fight showing the
favorite fighter. (iii) We construct a machine learning algorithm which predicts the
better fighter using information from both the fighter’s history, as well as, outcomes
of similar-performing fighters.
Our results show that in competitions fought between two participants very close
in strength, the red corner fighter still ends up winning significantly more on aver-
age. Even if a fighter is considered weaker, putting them in the red corner raises
18Winning via a cut may not be a perfect measure of how effective a cutman is due
to the nature of randomness of cuts. For instance, a fighter could lose the fight due
to a cut received during the same round, which would be no fault of the cutman.
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their probability of winning the fight. These results cannot be explained by red cor-
ner fighters having the better support of more skilled cutmen, nor by an aggressive
behavioral response from either side to the color red itself. Our findings can be at-
tributed to (1) Performance gains with a "signal of confidence" with the organizers of
the fights showing full confidence in a fighter even if they are the underdog. (2) Peer
effects among the red corner fighters, as they train and discuss fights together, they
potentially benefit from other red corner fighters with a longer tenure.
Our suggestions for firms are simple. With continuous signaling, firms should
let their employees be aware that they have full confidence in them. Showing such
confidence can significantly boost their employees’ performance, enabling them to
solve problems that they may go unsolved in the absence of these motivational ef-
fects. In addition, providing an environment where employees can train together and
exchange their ideas can provide further benefits, raising the overall productivity in
the workplace.
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics for red vs. blue corner
All Red Blue Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Difference t-statistic
Elo Score 1,522.999 36.178 1,528.189 38.636 1,517.809 32.732 -10.380∗∗∗ (-14.186)
Better Corner (Elo) 0.182 0.386 0.363 0.481 0.000 0.000 -0.363∗∗∗ (-52.272)
Better Corner (Bet) 0.119 0.323 0.237 0.425 0.000 0.000 -0.237∗∗∗ (-38.565)
Better Corner (Random Forest) 0.041 0.199 0.083 0.276 0.000 0.000 -0.083∗∗∗ (-17.503)
Elo Score Difference 0.000 35.417 10.380 33.864 -10.380 33.864 -20.761∗∗∗ (-30.000)
Bet Score Difference 0.000 0.413 0.138 0.389 -0.138 0.389 -0.277∗∗∗ (-30.419)
Random Forest Vote Difference -0.000 0.453 0.363 0.272 -0.363 0.271 -0.725∗∗∗ (-110.022)
Win? 0.500 0.500 0.675 0.468 0.325 0.468 -0.351∗∗∗ (-36.633)
N 9,578 4,789 4,789 9,578
100
Table 3.2 Confusion matrices for corner assignment
Corner Assignment
Blue Red Total
Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc.
Exp. Assignment (ELO)
Blue 2,188 64.4 1,210 35.7 3,398 50.1
Red 1,207 35.6 2,176 64.3 3,383 49.9
Total 3,395 100.0 3,386 100.0 6,781 100.0
Exp. Red Assignment (Bets)
Blue 1,945 66.1 993 33.8 2,938 50.0
Red 996 33.9 1,942 66.2 2,938 50.0
Total 2,941 100.0 2,935 100.0 5,876 100.0
Exp. Assignment (Random Forest)
Blue 3,114 91.7 281 8.3 3,395 50.1
Red 281 8.3 3,105 91.7 3,386 49.9
Total 3,395 100.0 3,386 100.0 6,781 100.0
Note: To appropriately compare the matching performance of the three variables, all
samples are restricted to contain only the same sample as the random forest.
Table 3.3 Win rate difference between the red corner vs. the blue corner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Red Corner 0.351*** 0.321*** 0.321*** 0.325***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Observations 9582 9582 9234 9008
Fighter FEs X X X
Location FEs X X
Controls X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
OLS estimates.
Controls: fighter rating, opponent rating, total hits, significant strikes %
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.4 Win rate difference for fighters with similar Elo ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
<45 <35 <25 <15 <5
Red Corner 0.310*** 0.313*** 0.306*** 0.296*** 0.370***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.027) (0.058)
Observations 7378 6390 4624 2432 601
Fighter FEs X X X X X
Location FEs X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.5 Win rate difference for fighters with similar bet expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
<.45 <.35 <.25 <.15 <.05
Red Corner 0.293*** 0.181*** 0.176*** 0.136** 0.257
(0.021) (0.064) (0.065) (0.068) (0.676)
Observations 3848 675 657 591 48
Fighter FEs X X X X X
Location FEs X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6 Win rate difference for fighters with similar random forest votes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
<.45 <.35 <.25 <.15 <.05
Red Corner 0.160*** 0.132*** 0.120*** 0.061 0.121
(0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.047) (0.185)
Observations 4193 3260 2192 1039 149
Fighter FEs X X X X X
Location FEs X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.7 Win rate difference for fighters undeservedly assigned to the red corner according to Elo ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Debuts Only Experienced PED No PED
Better Corner (Elo) 0.183*** 0.251*** 0.254*** 0.183*** 0.409*** 0.163*** 0.323*** 0.176***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.032) (0.016) (0.062) (0.014)
Observations 9578 9578 9230 9169 1739 7456 461 8665
Fighter FEs X X X X X X
Location FEs X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.8 Win rate difference for fighters undeservedly assigned to the red corner according to both Elo and betting market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Debuts Only Experienced PED No PED
Better Corner (ELO & Bets) -0.028 0.063** 0.070*** 0.048** 0.166*** 0.032 0.239** 0.042*
(0.022) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.064) (0.025) (0.110) (0.023)
Observations 7843 7843 7589 7558 1246 6310 354 7163
Fighter FEs X X X X X X
Location FEs X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
OLS estimates.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.9 Tabulation of corner assignment and trunks colors




Black 184 309 493
Blue 89 67 156
Gold 0 1 1
Green 36 27 63
Grey 172 87 259
Red 74 57 131
White 5 3 8
Yellow 40 49 89
Total 600 600 1,200
Table 3.10 Win rate difference of red assignment controlling for color
(1) (2) (3)
Red Corner 0.153*** 0.150***
(0.043) (0.042)
Fighter’s Shorts Are Red=1 -0.094 -0.104
(0.099) (0.101)
Fighter’s Opponent’s Shorts Are Red=1 0.128* 0.116
(0.073) (0.072)
Observations 982 982 982
Fighter FEs X X X
Location FEs X X X
Controls X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
OLS estimates.
Controls: Age, Opponent Age, Elo Difference
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.11 Win rate difference of better assignment controlling for color
(1) (2) (3)
Better Corner (Elo) 0.238*** 0.235***
(0.060) (0.060)
Fighter’s Shorts Are Red=1 -0.094 -0.107
(0.099) (0.100)
Fighter’s Opponent’s Shorts Are Red=1 0.128* 0.113
(0.073) (0.073)
Observations 982 982 982
Fighter FEs X X X
Location FEs X X X
Controls X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
OLS estimates.
Controls: Age, Opponent Age, Elo Difference
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.12 Win rate difference for fighters with similar Elo ratings (low purse fights)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
<45 <35 <25 <15 <5 <5, Experienced
Red Corner 0.292*** 0.322*** 0.375*** 0.295*** 0.613*** 0.599**
(0.053) (0.060) (0.070) (0.101) (0.179) (0.201)
Observations 628 527 378 189 22 20
Fighter FEs X X X X X X
Location FEs X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.13 Win rate difference for fighters with similar Elo ratings (high purse
fights)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
<45 <35 <25 <15 <5 <5, Experienced
Red Corner 0.314*** 0.315*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 0.394*** 0.398***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.028) (0.063) (0.083)
Observations 6681 5781 4153 2149 499 378
Fighter FEs X X X X X X
Location FEs X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.14 Tabulation of winning due to cuts and red corner assignment
Red Corner
0 1 Total
Win (Cut) 0 4,789 4,753 9,542
1 2 38 40
Total 4,791 4,791 9,582
Table 3.15 Win due to cuts rate difference for fighters assigned to the red corner per
both Elo ratings and bets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Red Corner 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 9578 9230 9230 9169
Fighter FEs X X X
Location FEs X X
Controls X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
OLS estimates.
Controls: fighter rating, opponent rating, total hits, significant strikes %
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.16 Win due to reasons other than facial cuts rate difference for fighters
assigned to the red corner per both Elo ratings and bets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Red Corner 0.343*** 0.314*** 0.315*** 0.223***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 9578 9230 9230 9169
Fighter FEs X X X
Location FEs X X
Controls X
Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at the fighter level.
OLS estimates.
Controls: fighter rating, opponent rating, total hits, significant strikes %
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 3.1 Official rankings and Elo ratings
Note: Opening bet is the first bet spread following the announcement of a lineup.
Closing bet is the last available bet spread before the fight. A PED case is a fighter
who was convicted for using performance enhancing drugs (PED).
Figure 3.2 Opening and closing bet spreads
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Appendix B
Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter
2
Table B.1 Variables list
Variable Name Variable Meaning
Superstar Present =1 if a superstar is present in a tourna-
ment.
Against Superstar =1 if a game is played against a superstar.
ELO Elo rating of a player.
ACPL Average Centipawn Loss of a player in a
game.
TotalBlunder Total number of blunders committed by a
player in a game. A move is considered a
blunder if the change in centipawn score is
more than 300 centipawns.
TotalMistake Total number of mistakes committed by a
player in a game. A move is considered a
mistake if the change in centipawn score is
between 100-300 centipawns.
Difficulty The board complexity metric estimated
via an Artificial Neural Network algo-
rithm.
win =1 if a player wins his or her game.
draw =1 if a games ends in a draw.
loss =1 if a player loses his or her game.
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Table B.1 Variables list (cont.)
Variable Name Variable Meaning
white =1 if a player’s side is white.
moves Total number of moves played by a player
in a game.
Round-robin tournament An invitation based tournament system
with a limited number of participants.
Each participant plays against partici-
pants once or twice, depending on the
tournament length. The participant who
accumulates the highest number of points
wins the tournament.
Swiss tournament A tournament system that is typically
used in open tournaments with a large
pool of participants. Following the re-
sults of the first round, winners are paired
with other winners. Towards the end of
the tournament, strongest players with the
highest number of scores get paired. The
participant who accumulates the highest
number of points wins the tournament.
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Table B.2 An example pgn file












1.d4 Nf6 2.c4 c5 3.d5 g6 4.Nc3 d6 5.e4 Bg7 6.Nf3 O-O 7.Be2 e5 8.O-O Ne8 9.Ne1 f5
10.exf5 gxf5 11.f4 Nd7 12.Nd3 e4 13.Nf2 Bxc3 14.bxc3 Ndf6 15.Be3 Ng7 16.Qe1 Bd7
17.Nd1 Ba4 18.h3 Bxd1 19.Qxd1 Qe8 20.Kf2 Qg6 21.Rg1 Kh8 22.a4 Rg8 23.Qf1 Nfh5
24.g3 Raf8 25.Qg2 Qf6 26.Rac1 Qd8 27.Qh2 Nf6 28.g4 Nd7 29.g5 Qa5 30.g6 h6 31.Rb1
Rb8 32.Qg3 Qd8 33.Ke1 Ne8 34.Kd2 Nf8 35.Bf2 Qe7 36.Ke3 Qf6 37.Kd2 Nxg6 38.h4
Ne7 39.Qh3 Rxg1 40.Rxg1 Qf7 41.h5 Nf6 42.Bh4 b6 43.Rb1 Qf8 44.Rg1 Qf7 45.Rb1
Qg7 46.Rg1 Qf8 47.Kc2 Nfg8 48.Kd2 Qf7 49.Kc2 Rf8 50.Kd2 Qe8 51.Ra1 Rf7 52.a5
bxa5 53.Rxa5 Nc8 54.Ra1 Qf8 55.Rb1 Nb6 56.Rg1 Rg7 57.Rxg7 Kxg7 58.Qg3+ Kh8
59.Qg6 a5 60.Bf1 a4 61.Kc2 a3 62.Kb3 Na4 63.Bh3 Qg7 64.Qxg7+ Kxg7 65.Bxf5 Nf6
66.Kxa3 Nxc3 67.Bf2 Ne2 68.Ka4 Nxh5 69.Ka5 Nf6 70.Kb6 Kf7 71.Kc7 Ke7 72.Be3
Nd4 73.Bg6 h5 74.Bf2 Nf3 75.Bf5 Nd2 76.Bh4 e3 77.Bd3 Nf3 78.Bxf6+ Kxf6 79.Kxd6
h4 80.Kc7 Nd4 81.Kc8 e2 0-1.
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Note: The tournament table is obtained from Chessbase Mega Database 2020.
Figure B.1 An example of a tournament table
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Table B.3 List of tournaments for Carlsen’s sample
Year Tournament Name
Panel A. Carlsen Present
2019 GCT Croatia 2019, Grenke Chess Classic 2019, Gashimov Memorial 2019,
Norway Chess 2019, Sinquefield 2019, Tata Steel 2019
2018 Gashimov Memorial 2018, Sinquefield 2018, Biel 2018, Norway Chess 2018,
Grenke Chess Classic 2018, Tata Steel 2018
2017 London Classic 2017, Norway Chess 2017, Sinquefield 2017,
Grenke Chess Classic 2017, Tata Steel 2017
2016 Norway Chess 2016, Tata Steel 2016, Bilbao Masters 2016
2015 London Classic 2015, Sinquefield 2015, Norway Chess 2015,
Gashimov Memorial 2015, Grenke Chess Classic 2015, Tata Steel 2015
2014 Norway Chess 2014, Zuerich Chess Challange 2014, Sinquefield 2014,
Gashimov Memorial 2014
2013 Moscow Tal Memorial 2013, Norway Chess 2013, Candidates Tournament 2013,
Tata Steel 2013, Sinquefield 2013
Panel B. Carlsen Not Present
2019 U.S. Championship 2019, Dortmund 2019
2018 Candidates Tournament 2018, U.S. Championship 2018, Dortmund 2018
2017 U.S. Championship 2017, Dortmund 2017, Gashimov Memorial 2017
2016 London Classic 2016, Sinquefield 2016, Gashimov Memorial 2016,
Candidates Tournament 2016, Moscow Tal Memorial 2016,
U.S. Championship 2016, Dortmund 2016
2015 Dortmund 2015, Zuerich Chess Challenge 2015, Tbilisi FIDE GP 2015,
Khanty-Mansiysk FIDE GP 2015, Capablanca Memorial 2015,
U.S. Championship 2015
2014 Beijing Sportaccord Basque 2014, London Classic 2014, Tashkent FIDE GP 2014,
Dortmund 2014, Tata Steel 2014,
U.S. Championship 2014, Candidates Tournament 2014, Baku FIDE GP 2014,
Capablanca Memorial 2014, Bergomo ACP Golden Classic 2014
2013 Paris FIDE GP 2013, Dortmund 2013, Thessaloniki FIDE GP 2013,
Zug FIDE GP 2013, Beijing FIDE GP 2013, Zuerich Chess Challenge 2013,
Grenke Chess Classic 2013, Capablanca Memorial 2013, U.S. Championship 2013
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Table B.4 List of tournaments for Kasparov’s sample
Year Tournament Name
Panel A. Kasparov Present
2001 Astana 2001, Zuerich 2001, Linares 2001, Corus Wijk aan Zee 2001
2000 Fujitsu Siemens Giants 2000, Sarajevo Bosnia 2000, Linares 2000,
Corus Wijk aan Zee 2000
1999 Sarajevo Bosnia 1999, Linares 1999, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1999
1998 Linares 1998
1997 Tilburg 1997, Novgorod 1997, Linares 1997
1996 Las Palmas 1996, Dos Hermanas 1996, Amsterdam Euwe Memorial 1996
1995 Horgen 1995, Amsterdam Euwe Memorial 1995, Novgorod 1995
Riga Tal Memorial 1995
Panel B. Kasparov Not Present
2001 Sigeman & Co 2001, Biel 2001, Dortmund 2001, Pamplona 2001,
Dos Hermanas 2001
2000 Japfa Classic 2000, Dortmund 2000, Sigeman & Co 2000, Biel 2000
1999 Pamplona 1999, Lost Boys Amsterdam 1999, Dortmund 1999, Sigeman & Co 1999
Dos Hermanas 1999, Biel 1999
1998 Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1998, Tilburg 1998, Dortmund 1998, Madrid 1998,
Pamplona 1998
1997 Hoogovens Merrillville 1997, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1997,
Sigeman & Co 1997, Ubeda 1997, Dos Hermanas 1997, Lost Boys 1997,
Dortmund 1997, Madrid 1997, Belgrade Investbank 1997
1996 Koop Tjuchem 1996, Donner Memorial 1996, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1996,
Tilburg 1996, Dortmund 1996, Dos Hermanas 1996, Madrid 1996
1995 Belgrade Investbank 1995, Donner Memorial 1995, Biel 1995, Madrid 1995,
Dos Hermanas 1995, Groningen 1995, Dortmund 1995
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Table B.5 List of tournaments for Kasparov and Karpov’s sample
Year Tournament Name




1991 Reggio Emilia 1991, Tilburg 1991, Amsterdam Euwe Memorial 1991, Linares 1991
1990
1989 World Cup Skelleftea 1989
1988 USSR Championship 1988, World Cup Belfort 1988, Optiebeurs Amsterdam 1988
1987 Brussels 1987
Panel B. Kasparov & Karpov Neither Present
1994 Donner Memorial 1994, Dortmund 1994, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1994,
Groningen 1994, Munich 1994
1993 Antwerp 1993, Amsterdam VSB 1993, Madrid 1993, Las Palmas 1993,
Munich 1993
1992 Alekhine Memorial 1992, Amsterdam Euwe Memorial 1992,
Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1992, Groningen 1992, Munich 1992
1991 World Cup Reykjavik 1991, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1991,
Groningen 1991, Munich 1991
1990 Tilburg 1990, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1990, Prague 1990,
Groningen 1990, Munich 1990
1989 Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1989, Groningen 1989, Munich 1989,
Amsterdam Euwe Memorial 1989
1988 Amsterdam Euwe Memorial 1988, OHRA Amsterdam 1988, Linares 1988,
Hastings 1988
1987 Belgrade Investbanka 1987, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1987, Interpolis 1987,
OHRA Amsterdam 1987, Reykjavik 1987
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Table B.6 List of tournaments for Karpov’s sample
Year Tournament Name
Panel A. Karpov Present
1983 Interpolis 1983, International DSB Mephisto GM 1983, USSR Final 1983,
Bath 1983, Linares 1983
1982 Interpolis 1982, Turin 1982, Hamburg 1982, London Phillips 1982,
Mar del Plata Clarin Masters 1982
1981 IBM Herinnerungs Toernooi 1981, Moscow 1981, Linares 1981
1980 Buenos Aires 1980, Interpolis 1980, IBM Kroongroep 1980,
Bugojno 1980, Bad Kissingen 1980
1979 Interpolis 1979, Waddinxveen KATS 1979, Montreal International 1979,
GER International 1979
1978 Bugojno 1978
1977 Interpolis 1977, October Revolution 1977, Las Palmas 1977, GER International 1977
1976 USSR Final 1976, Montilla 1976, Manila Marlboro 1976, Amsterdam 1976,
Skopje Solidarnost 1976
Panel B. Karpov Not Present
1983 Jakarta International 1983, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1983
1982 Bugojno 1982, Moscow Interzonal 1982, Las Palmas Interzonal 1982,
Toluca Interzonal 1982, Niksic International 1982, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1982
1981 Las Palmas 1981, IBM Herinnerungs Toernooi 1981, Interpolis 1981,
Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1981
1980 Buenos Aires 1980, London Phillips 1980, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1980,
Las Palmas 1980, Reykjavik International 1980
1979 Buenos Aires Clarin 1979, Riga Interzonal 1979, Buenos Aires Interzonal 1979,
Vidmar Memorial 1979, IBM 1979, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1979,
Buenos Aires Konex 1979
1978 Interpolis 1978, Reykjavik International 1978, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1978,
Las Palmas 1978, IBM 1978, Clarin 1978
1977 Geneve 1977, Vidmar Memorial 1977, Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1977, IBM 1977
1976 Interzonal 1976, Las Palmas 1976, Reykjavik International 1976,
Hoogovens Wijk aan Zee 1976, IBM 1976
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Table B.7 List of tournaments for Fischer’s sample
Year Tournament Name
Panel A. Fischer Present
1970 Interzonal 1970, Buenos Aires 1970, Rovinj Zagreb 1970
1969
1968 Vinkovci 1968, Nathanya 1968,
1967 Skopje 1967, Monaco Grand Prix 1967
1966 Piatigorsky Cup 1966, U.S. Championship 1966
1965 U.S. Championship 1965, Capablanca Memorial 1965
1964
1963 U.S. Championship 1963
1962 U.S. Championship 1962, Candidates Tournament 1962, Interzonal 1962
Panel B. Fischer Not Present
1970 Vinkovci 1970, IBM 1970, Budapest 1970, Sarajevo 1970, Caracas 1970,
Wijk an Zee 1970, Costa del Sol 1970, Skopje 1970,
Rubinstein Memorial 1970, Christmas Congress 1970
1969 Monaco GP 1969, Wijk an Zee 1969, Venice 1969, Capablanca Memorial 1969,
U.S. Championship 1969, Palma de Mallorca 1969, IBM 1969,
Sarajevo 1969, Christmas Congress 1969, Rubinstein Memorial 1969
1968 Rubinstein Memorial 1968, Christmas Congress 1968, Palma de Mallorca 1968,
U.S. Championship 1968, Bamberg 1968, IBM 1968, Sarajevo 1968
Wijk an Zee 1968, Monaco Grand Prix 1968, Skopje 1968
1967 Winnipeg 1967, Leningrad 1967, Moscow 1967,
Capablanca Memorial 1967, Palma de Mallorca 1967, Sarajevo 1967,
Beverwijk 1967, Christmas Congress 1967,
Rubinstein Memorial 1967, Venice 1967, IBM 1967
1966 IBM 1966, Sarajevo 1966, Palma de Mallorca 1966, Beverwijk 1966,
Venice 1966, Rubinstein Memorial 1966, Christmas Congress 1966
1965 ZSK Internat’l 1965, Zagreb 1965, Mer del Plata 1965, Rubinstein Memorial 1965,
IBM 1965, Sarajevo 1965, Beverwijk 1965, Christmas Congress 1965
1964 Buenos Aires 1964, Capablanca Memorial 1964, Rubinstein Memorial 1964,
Interzonal 1964, IBM 1964, Sarajevo 1964, Beverwijk 1964,
Christmas Congress 1964, ZSK International 1964
1963 Piatigorsky Cup 1963, Alekhine Memorial 1963, IBM 1963, Sarajevo 1963,
Beverwijk 1963, Rubinstein Memorial 1963, Christmas Congress 1963,
Capablanca Memorial 1963
1962 Mer del Plata 1962, Sarajevo 1962, Beverwijk 1962, Rubinstein Memorial 1962,
Christmas Congress 1962, Capablanca Memorial 1962
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Table B.8 List of tournaments for Hou Yifan’s sample
Year Tournament Name
Panel A. Hou Yifan Present
2015 Monte Carlo FIDE GP 2015
2014 Lopota FIDE GP 2014, Khanty-Mansiysk FIDE GP 2014,
Sharjah FIDE GP 2014
Panel B. Hou Yifan Not Present
2019 Skolkovo FIDE GP 2019, Saint Louis Cairns Cup 2019
2016 Khanty-Mansiysk FIDE GP 2016, Chengdu FIDE GP 2016,
Batumi FIDE GP 2016, Tehran FIDE GP 2016
Table B.9 List of tournaments for Rausis’ sample
Year Tournament Name
Panel A. Rausis Present
2019 Lugano op 2019
2018 Sautron op 2018
2017
2016 Salon de Provence op 2016
2015
2014 Chemnitz op 2014, Biella op 2014
2013 Charleroi op 2013, Lueneburg op 2013
2012 Tres Cantos op 2012
Panel B. Rausis Not Present
2019 Locarno op 2019, Ascona op 2019, Porto San Giorgio op 2019
2018 Erfurt op 2018, Pfarrkirchen Rottal op 2018, Locarno op 2018,
Paderborn op 2018, Forchheim op 2018
2017 Pfarrkirchen Rottal op 2017, Lugano op 2017, Sautron op 2017
2016 Wasselonne op 2016, Heraklion op 2016
2015 Salon de Provence op 2015, Biella op 2015, Porto San Giorgio op 2015,
Erfurt op 2015, Lugano op 2015, Ascona op 2015, Forchheim op 2015
2014 Salon de Provence op 2014, Paderborn op 2014, Erfurt op 2014
Arco op 2014, Ascona op 2014, Forchheim op 2014
2013 Biella op 2013, Forchheim op 2013
129
